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Abstract  
Biodiversity is a concept that plays a key role in both scientific theories such as the 
species-area law and conservation politics. Currently, however, little agreement exists 
on how biodiversity should be defined, let alone measured. This has led to sugges-
tions that biodiversity is not a metaphysically robust concept, with major implications 
for its usefulness in formulating scientific theories and making conservation deci-
sions. 
A general discussion of biodiversity is presented, highlighting its application both in 
scientific and conservation contexts, its relationship with environmental ethics, and 
existing approaches to its measurement. To overcome the limitations of existing 
biodiversity concepts, a new concept of biocomplexity is proposed. This concept 
equates the biodiversity of any biological system with its effective complexity. Biocom-
plexity is shown to be the only feasible measure of biodiversity that captures the 
essential features desired of a general biodiversity concept. In particular, it is a well-
defined, measurable and strongly intrinsic property of any biological system. Finally, 
the practical application of biocomplexity is discussed. 
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1 Biodiversity: introduction to a problem  
All animals are equal but some are cetaceans. 
 — Neils Einarsson 
As a rejoinder to the tradition of natural theology that seeks evidence of God’s 
benevolence in the natural world, biologists are fond of a famous epigram attributed 
to J.B.S. Haldane. According to G. Evelyn Hutchinson, 
Haldane … found himself in the company of a group of theologians. On 
being asked what one could conclude as to the nature of the creator 
from a study of his creation, Haldane is said to have answered, “An in-
ordinate fondness for beetles.” (Hutchinson, 1959) 
A nice line, but why did Haldane single out beetles? Recent estimates of the total 
number of formally named species stand at 1.4–1.6 million1 (Wilson, 1986; Stork, 
1996). Of this total, more than half are insects, and nearly half of this total are 
beetles. Hence beetles represent almost 25% of all named species, a total of about 
400,000 (Hammond, 1992). This compares with the modest totals of about 4,000 
mammal and 9,000 bird species (Wilson, 1986). Moreover, very few mammal or bird 
species remain to be discovered, whereas unnamed beetle species probably outnum-
ber named species by at least an order of magnitude. Estimates of total species 
numbers are embarrassingly imprecise, ranging from 1.5 million to 300 million 
(Stork, 1996), with 30 million being a commonly quoted figure for tropical forest 
arthropods (Erwin, 1982). Given that beetles comprise about 40% of all arthropods, 
there may be as many as 12 million species of beetle on the planet. If, according to 
                              
1 The estimated number of names defined by taxonomists is 1.8–2.0 million; however, the level of 
synonymy among insects is estimated at about 20% (Stork, 1996). 
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Haldane, we should one day meet the almighty face-to-face, he is much more likely 
to resemble a beetle than the Archbishop of Canterbury. 
From a conservation perspective, this extraordinary abundance of beetle species in 
comparison to our favourite furred and feathered creatures raises an obvious but 
interesting question. Are some species more worthy of conservation than others? If 
we take this question seriously, the answer is an obvious ‘yes’. There are perhaps as 
many as 12 million species in the clade Coleoptera and only a few dozen in the clade 
Cetacea, and yet, despite the vastly greater extinction rate of the former, we seem far 
less concerned about the plight of beetles than of whales. Of course, whales are big, 
intelligent and spectacular, all of which contribute to our concern for their welfare, 
whereas beetles are small, stupid and non-descript. Moreover, despite the vast 
number of beetle species, most of which have never been named, described or even 
observed, all of them are just that—beetles. To most of us, one beetle species is not 
very different from any other. Even a well-trained entomologist may have difficulty 
distinguishing closely related species. Why should we care too much about losing one 
beetle species to extinction when there are 12 million others? 
There is a well-recognised problem with this argument. It is what Thomas Lovejoy 
has called the ‘incrementalist problem’ (Lovejoy, 1986). If we accept the argument, 
then loss of one unknown beetle species is acceptable, both from an ethical and 
practical perspective. After all, the vast majority of all species that have ever lived are 
now extinct, and the evolution of all extant species has relied to some degree on 
these past extinctions (May, 1994). By the same reasoning, the loss of two species is 
also acceptable. At what point, however, is further species loss unacceptable? As 
Norman Myers puts it, 
When do species losses shift from being marginal to becoming signifi-
cant, serious, critical, crucial, and catastrophic? (Myers, 1991, p. 20) 
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Paul and Anne Ehrlich used a now famous metaphor to describe this problem. 
Imagine being on an aeroplane and seeing someone slowly removing rivets from a 
wing. The loss of one rivet is not important; the wing will stay on and the plane will 
fly regardless. Even with the loss of two, three or a handful of rivets, the plane will 
continue to fly. At some point, however, too few rivets will remain to hold the wing 
in place and the plane will fall from the sky. To preserve the wing intact, the Ehrlichs 
argue, we must fight to save each rivet (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1981). 
The incrementalist problem has forced environmental campaigners to shift their 
focus away from efforts to preserve individual species towards the protection of 
whole ecosystems. The single-species approach to conservation works well for large, 
easily identified and charismatic species such as giant pandas, but it becomes 
hopelessly impractical for protecting organisms that provide a host of essential 
biological functions such as producing oxygen, purifying water and recycling soil 
nutrients. To protect these organisms required the invention of a new concept with 
its own neologism—biodiversity. 
The term biodiversity was coined in 1985 by W.G. Rosen as a contraction of the phrase 
biological diversity. As Rosen later noted wryly, all he had to do was “take the ‘logical’ 
out of ‘biological’” (Takacs, 1996, p. 37). The exact meaning of biodiversity is 
somewhat nebulous. Etymologically, the word refers simply to the diversity of the 
biological world. The world has many different kinds of things, and biodiversity 
captures some notion of both the number of different kinds of things and the degree 
of difference between them. Many biologists define biodiversity as something like 
“the variety of life forms, the ecological roles they perform and the genetic diversity 
they contain” (Wilcox, 1984, p. 640). Biodiversity therefore captures more than just 
the number of species in the world; it also includes the rich variety of forms they 
represent, their complex interactions and the many ecological functions they 
perform. 
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By uniting the world’s millions of small, unloved creatures under the banner of 
biodiversity, conservation biologists had suddenly created a new political weapon. 
Instead of arguing for the preservation of individual species, with the practical and 
logical weaknesses that such a position entails, they could now argue for the 
preservation of biodiversity—an all-embracing concept that includes all species from 
whales to beetles. 
Since its invention, the concept of biodiversity has grown enormously in usage, both 
within the scientific and lay communities. As a keyword in Biological Abstracts, 
biodiversity does not appear at all in 1987, while biological diversity appears only three 
times. By 1992, biodiversity appears 87 times and biological diversity 36 times. Since 1997, 
biodiversity alone has appeared over 1000 times per annum. 
The continuing existence of the biodiversity concept relies on a perception that 
biodiversity is an objectively specifiable property of biological systems that is worth 
preserving. While biological diversity was never intended to delineate anything precise, 
biodiversity includes a degree of scientific respectability, and not without some 
justification. After all, it is given a scientific as well as a political role in the reformula-
tion of the species-area law of ecology.2 But biodiversity has never been a clearly 
defined term. Just what is biodiversity? What is its metaphysical status? Is it an 
intrinsic or anthropocentric property? Does it have one or many forms? And why 
should we protect it? These questions are not without importance. Without some 
firm foundation, the concept of biodiversity may prove unable to sustain the weight 
imposed by both its scientific and political roles. How can we develop a science of 
ecology if our fundamental concepts are suspect? And why try to preserve something 
                              
2 In its simplest form, the species-area law states that larger areas harbour proportionally more species 
than smaller ones. It dates back at least as far as the early 19th century work of Alexander von 
Humboldt (Rosenzweig, 1999). 
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called biodiversity if that term is based on the subjective preferences of some small 
groups of scientists? 
My intention is to resolve these issues. I address two primary questions, namely: 
1. What is the metaphysical status of biodiversity? More specifically, can we 
construe the concept of biodiversity in such a way as to make it an intrinsic3 
property? 
2. Can we measure biodiversity, and if so, how? 
These two questions are far from independent. Developing a more metaphysically 
secure definition of biodiversity may suggest how we should go about measuring it, 
whereas developing a well-defined and independently-specifiable measurement 
procedure suggests that biodiversity may be an intrinsic property of any biological 
system. 
My answers to both questions are affirmative. Biodiversity, properly interpreted, is an 
intrinsic property that can be measured. To demonstrate this, I formulate biodiversity 
in terms of biological complexity. Complexity, or at least a particular type of 
complexity, is an intrinsic and quantifiable property, and hence so is biodiversity 
construed as biological complexity. Moreover, I make an additional and stronger 
claim, which is that biological complexity is the only sensible interpretation of 
biodiversity that makes it a strongly intrinsic property. 
                              
3 There is much debate among philosophers over the exact meaning of intrinsic, which I do not wish to 
rehearse here. An intrinsic property of an object is generally considered to be one that does not 
depend on any relationship between that object and something else. It is therefore non-relational. In 
particular, it is non-anthropocentric. I include an additional criterion in my definition; that of non-
arbitrariness. Under this definition, the mass of an object is an intrinsic property of that object, 
whereas its property of ‘having mass between 0.31 and 0.35 kg’ is not. 
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One other important question concerning biodiversity is, why should we care? Why 
protect biodiversity? I do not attempt to answer this question here. Foundational 
questions in ethics are notoriously intractable, and environmental ethics is no 
exception to this rule. However, if we are to have some hope of determining why it is 
important to protect biodiversity, we must at least begin with a good understanding 
of what we are trying to protect. So my project at least offers a more solid starting 
point for ethical enquiry. 
In the following chapter, I outline what we want from a biodiversity concept, both 
from scientific and conservation perspectives. Whereas addressing the scientific 
aspect of this question is easy, the conservation aspect is not. To do so requires a 
venture into environmental ethics to look at the types of value we might ascribe to 
the natural world and how they relate to biodiversity. Although I make no grand 
claims for solving problems of environmental ethics, this discussion will, I hope, 
illustrate the interface between environmental ethics and my project. In Chapter 3, I 
turn to the issue of measuring biodiversity, including a survey of existing approaches 
to measuring biodiversity and a discussion of one attempt to resolve its metaphysical 
status. An understanding of such prior art is, of course, essential for placing my 
contribution in context. In Chapter 4, I discuss the concept of complexity, along with 
its measurement and metaphysics. This discussion is a key input for the following 
chapters, where I develop and discuss my own brand of biodiversity based on 
complexity. I label this concept, predictably enough, biocomplexity. In Chapter 5, I 
flesh out this concept of biocomplexity in more detail, discussing its metaphysics, 
demonstrating that it is a uniquely intrinsic property, and defending it from some 
potential criticisms. Finally in Chapter 6, I discuss the application of biocomplexity. 
In doing so, I revisit some of the existing measures of biodiversity discussed in 
Chapter 3, and illustrate their merits as estimator measures of biocomplexity. 
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Before I begin, there are two points I should make clear. The first is that I have 
adopted what to a crude approximation can be described as a scientific realist stance. 
This is not the place to fight out a realist-antirealist debate, and I will make no 
attempt to do so. I will simply assume that there are truths to be discovered and that 
it is the aim of science to discover those truths. The second point is that my central 
thesis is not normative. As I have already stated, my main goal is to understand what 
biodiversity is, not why we ought to save it. Although I sometimes suggest some 
answers to the latter question, none are intended to answer it definitively. 
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2 Concepts of biodiversity  
This capacity of a thing to reveal itself in unexpected ways in the future, I attribute to 
the fact that the thing observed is an aspect of reality, possessing a significance that is 
not exhausted by our conception of any single aspect of it. To trust that a thing we 
know is real is, in this sense, to feel that it has the independence and power for mani-
festing itself in yet unthought of ways in the future. 
 — Michael Polanyi 
Beauty in things exists in the mind which contemplates them. 
 — David Hume 
2.1 Scientific versus political concepts of biodiversity 
What do we want from a concept such as biodiversity? As I have outlined in the 
Introduction, there are at least two distinct applications of the biodiversity concept. 
One is scientific, and the other political. A scientific concept of biodiversity is one 
that plays some useful role in scientific theories, just as the concept of mass plays a 
useful role in Newtonian mechanics. Moreover, if biodiversity were something we 
could measure, perhaps we could discover or at least refine our understanding of the 
relationships between some attributes of ecosystems and their biodiversity; relation-
ships such as the species-area law. A political concept of biodiversity is one that can 
be used for conservation purposes. Under this formulation, biodiversity is, or at least 
is an indicator of, something of value that we wish to preserve. 
The key attributes we want from any scientific concept are that it is: 
1. well-defined 
2. based on some natural properties of the world 
3. useful in some scientific theory. 
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The first criterion ensures we know what we are talking about, the second ensures 
long term stability in our attempts to agree on how to understand and manipulate the 
concept, while the third ensures that the concept actually does some scientific work. 
Mass, for example, meets all three criteria. It is well-defined (the amount of matter in 
a body4), is a natural property of physical objects that we can measure with precision, 
and is useful in several scientific theories such as Newtonian mechanics. Fear as a 
concept in psychology also meets the above criteria, even though, unlike mass, it 
cannot be measured precisely. 
Species richness, defined simply as the number of species in a given area or population, 
at least partially matches all three criteria. Although there is as yet no agreement on 
what constitutes a species,5 there is at least some hope that such agreement can 
eventually be reached. The first and second criteria would then be at least partially 
satisfied. The third criterion is more problematic. Limited versions of the species 
richness concept do play useful roles in scientific theories such as the species-area law. 
For example, there are often weak but definite mathematical relationships between 
the number of mammal species on each of a group of islands and the areas of each 
of those islands. 
Mathematical relationships involving a more general notion of species richness tend to 
be less precise. This is partly explained by the fact that different species are not 
directly commensurate. The set of factors that unites red kangaroos together as a 
single species is not identical to the set of factors that unites E. coli bacteria. We can 
                              
4 Matter is sometimes defined as that which has mass. As with many quantities in physics, there is a 
degree of circularity in attempts to definite mass. In Newtonian physics, we can define (inertial) mass 
as the constant of proportionality between force and acceleration. The fact that there is such a 
constant, and that it obeys superposition, strengthens our conviction in the existence of mass as a 
measurable quantity. This two-way exchange between theory and experiment ensures the circularity in 
the definition of mass is not vicious. 
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combine counts of kangaroo and bacteria species together, but there is little reason 
to think that the resulting measure will be highly predictive because the underlying 
units are not, at the level of interest, the same sorts of things. Measuring biodiversity 
by simply counting species is like measuring the productivity of Queensland fruit-
growers by counting individual pieces of fruit. At one level, grapes and watermelons 
are the same sort of thing (pieces of fruit), but they are not commensurate as units of 
productivity. Nevertheless, we might still expect the fruit-count measure to go up 
and down in response to good and bad years, just as we might expect to see striking 
but imperfect correlations between species richness and land area. Both concepts are 
at least somewhat useful. 
As well as the species-area law, biodiversity as a scientific concept also arises in 
several questions posed by ecology. For example, are biodiverse ecosystems more or 
less stable than simple ecosystems?6 Does biodiversity reflect sustainability? Does 
biodiversity reflect the evolutionary time elapsed without major disturbance, or does 
it reflect the frequency of major disturbance in ecological or evolutionary history? 
(Harper & Hawksworth, 1994). There is a recognition in such debates that biodiversity 
expresses something more sophisticated than mere species richness. It includes 
diversity at several levels, from genes to species to ecosystems. Scientific biodiversity 
recognises that species are not commensurate—that some species count for more 
diversity than others. Just as fruit-count is an indicator of a more meaningful measure 
of productivity such as fruit biomass, species richness is at most an indicator of some 
more meaningful but yet-to-be-determined measure of biodiversity. 
If a more meaningful scientific definition of biodiversity than species richness is 
possible, then our failure yet to devise one simply reflects our present ignorance. Just 
                                                                                                                                     
5 See, for example, Sterelny and Griffiths (1999, chapter 9) for a recent review. 
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as the concept of weight is a slightly vague but useful approximation to the more 
precise concept of mass, species richness is potentially an indicator of some deeper 
concept of biodiversity. Ecology is, after all, an imprecise science. Generalities are 
often swamped by particulars, blurring and distorting mathematical relationships. 
Organisms are not as interchangeable with one another as are electrons. Different 
concepts of biodiversity may also be required for different applications. The 
biodiversity that underlies the species-area law may not be the same as the biodiver-
sity that determines ecosystem stability. 
Most existing attempts to better define and measure biodiversity do not address the 
question of whether or not biodiversity is a scientifically useful concept. Their 
primary motivation is to develop a concept of biodiversity that is useful for making 
conservation decisions. This is an approach I intend to emulate. Nevertheless, the 
concept of biodiversity I will develop may prove scientifically useful. It satisfies 
criteria 1 and 2 above and also overcomes the species commensurability problem. In 
addressing predominantly philosophical questions, this is as much as I can hope to 
do. Whether the concept does prove to be scientifically useful is an empirical 
question. It is not mine to answer.  
As a concept in conservation biology, biodiversity is used as a tool for measuring 
some sort of ‘conservation value’. If, for example, a government wished to divide an 
area of land currently used for logging, and conserve one half by creating a new 
national park, a rational strategy would be to conserve that portion of land with the 
highest conservation value. In recent years, this conservation value has become more 
frequently measured in terms of biodiversity. So if, all other known factors being 
equal, one part of the area in question contains a relatively large number of endan-
                                                                                                                                     
6 See, for example, Naeem & Li (1997). 
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gered mammal species, it would make sense to include that area in the new national 
park. In this case, a larger number of mammal species is seen as more valuable than a 
smaller number of mammal species. Mammals may also be an indicator of diversity 
among species from other groups not surveyed, in which case selecting the area with 
more mammals automatically increases the probability of selecting the area with 
more species from these other groups. This sort of application of the biodiversity 
concept in conservation efforts is now quite common, despite the lack of agreement 
on what biodiversity is. 
As discussed in the Introduction, there is a strong political motivation for question-
ing the metaphysical status of biodiversity. If biodiversity is an anthropocentric 
concept—one defined only in terms of what some group of individuals wishes to 
protect—the motivations of those defining biodiversity and calling for its protection 
may be called into question. Of course, there are plenty of reasons to protect various 
aspects of the natural world. The pollination of food crops by wild bees is one simple 
example. As a workable concept, however, an anthropocentric definition of biodiver-
sity poses problem. A naïve account defining biodiversity simply as ‘that which we 
wish to protect’ is vacuous. It tells us nothing we do not already know. Such a 
concept of biodiversity is simply a banner under which we can list some gerryman-
dered collection of things. We could develop a more sophisticated anthropocentric 
concept of biodiversity in terms of the responses of ideal agents acting under certain 
circumstances with certain information. However, even such a sophisticated concept 
of biodiversity is unwieldy and brings us little closer in practical terms to defining 
what we mean by biodiversity. 
If biodiversity is to be useful as a tool in conservation, it must not only correspond 
to something worthy of protection; we must also be able to agree, more or less, what 
it is. And we should ideally be able to measure it, at least in relative terms. In other 
words, if we have two biologically rich areas, A and B, and we want to decide which 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 14 
one to give greater priority in terms of conservation using biodiversity as the 
criterion, we should be able to say either A has more biodiversity than B, B has more 
biodiversity than A, or A and B have the same amount of biodiversity. An intrinsic 
concept of biodiversity offers a possible solution to such problems. 
In the remainder of this Chapter, I outline the sort of criteria that can be used for 
determining whether something is worth protecting, and hence that might form part 
of this conservation-based biodiversity concept. Before doing so, however, I want to 
discuss a useful tool for analysing comparative measures of conservation value. 
2.2 Biological triage 
Triage is a procedure for determining the order in which wounded soldiers are given 
medical treatment based on their condition. Priorities are assigned to each soldier in 
order to maximise the probable number of survivors, given the constraints on the 
rate at which medical treatment can be given. This strategy means giving high priority 
to those soldiers who will probably die unless treated urgently, moderate priority to 
those who will probably survive without immediate treatment and low priority to 
those who will probably die even with urgent treatment. Triage is similarly applied in 
the casualty wards of major hospitals, although more with a view to minimising some 
notion of the net total of patient suffering rather than simply the number of 
casualties. 
The analogous concept of biological triage is useful for thinking through difficult 
conservation issues.7 Given the rapid rate at which species are becoming extinct and 
the limited resources available with which to help conserve them, how should such 
                              
7 Further discussions of biological triage can be found in Mann & Plummer (1995), Takacs (1996) and 
Maclaurin (1998b). 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 15 
limited resources best be spent? As with conventional triage, arriving at the best 
possible outcome requires that resources be focussed on the more urgent cases, with 
the possible exception of some ‘lost causes’. However, we should also focus on 
maximising conservation value. For example, if species A and B are equally likely to 
become extinct and we can only afford to spend money on protecting one of them, it 
makes sense to pick the one we value most highly. Most of us value giant pandas 
more highly than smallpox virus, so we sensibly focus more effort on protecting the 
former. 
Biological triage is a useful tool for working out what we value and by how much (at 
least in relative terms) by asking what we are willing to sacrifice to protect it. If we 
were given the choice of protecting humpback whales or 2.5 million Amazon 
rainforest beetle species, and chose the former, then that tells us humpback whales 
have at least as much conservation value as those 2.5 million beetles. Of course, not 
everyone would agree about the number of beetle species that are equivalent in 
conservation value to the single species of humpback whale, but in most cases we 
can at least derive some rough estimate. I suspect nearly everyone would at least 
value humpback whales more than one beetle species. 
The concept of biological triage is not without controversy, even though many 
biologists reluctantly accept the need for devising some means of prioritising 
conservation efforts. As Robert May puts it, 
As more and more species face extinction in the wild over the next few 
decades, how do we go about making choices for the ineluctably limited 
number of places on the ark? (May, 1990) 
Many other biologists, however, reject triage outright. Takacs (1996) provides an 
illuminating survey of various biologists opinions on the matter. Edward Wilson 
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asserts, “I think we ought to save it all, as a basic principle” (p. 60), while Reed Noss 
unequivocally states 
I reject triage … It’s ethically pernicious to me … I think that the argu-
ment that there isn’t enough money, there aren’t enough resources in 
general to protect all species and some of them we’re just going to have 
to let go, is disingenuous. (p. 60) 
Donald Falk is even more adamant. 
You cannot persuade me that we are in a triage situation with respect to 
the resources to save life on earth. I do not accept it. I think it’s a com-
pletely fallacious argument. Just as medicine tries to save every patient 
they can, that has absolutely got to be our mission. If we fail, we fail. (p. 
60) 
Such views are difficult to reconcile with the present disparity between extinction 
rates and conservation efforts. Rejecting even the concept of triage does not answer 
difficult ethical questions; it simply avoids them. The unease of medical professionals 
when making decisions that preserve the lives of some over the lives of others does 
not prevent them from carrying out medical triage. Such decisions are simply forced 
upon them by the impossibility of saving everyone. Regardless of whether or not we 
think biological triage is an appropriate conservation policy, the concept of biological 
triage is a useful tool for thinking through difficult conservation issues. Even if we 
lived in an ideal world where we could protect everything, supposing that we are 
forced to make a choice about what to protect helps us understand what we value 
and how we value it. If we want to protect the biological world, it must have some 
value. And, if forced to make a choice, we prefer to protect some elements of it over 
others, then those elements must have more value than others. 
Other biologists reject triage for practical rather than conceptual reasons. David 
Woodruff, for example, states 
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Pragmatically, we cannot save each and every species. If you force me—
so then I think you have to rank or prioritize your species. I’d rather not 
use the word triage, because that means that you consciously have every-
thing set out. You go past each stretcher and you put one of three colors 
on it. We don’t know where the stretchers are, let alone who’s on the 
stretchers. So instead, my attitude is to prioritize from what you do 
know. And then pick the key species through—by working, by concen-
trating on those key species, you will be able to save ecosystems and lar-
ger units. (Takacs, 1996, pp. 60–61) 
In a similar vein, Lovejoy finds triage  
… inadequate to the situation … Conceptually, it’s an easy way out. To 
actually do it intelligently would be a bitch. (Takacs, 1996, pp. 61–62) 
There are good reasons for taking this practical objection to triage more seriously. 
Woodruff’s argument is simply that triage could only work in a world where more 
information is available than in ours. Of course we would prefer to prioritise species 
and protect those with the highest priority first, but the act of trying to prioritise 
species distracts us from the main task at hand, which is to protect whatever we can. 
At the end of the day, most of our conservation decisions will be based on far more 
practical considerations than whether species A has more conservation value than 
species B. Moreover, a whole-ecosystem approach to conservation is likely to save 
far more species than a piecemeal species-by-species approach. 
This objection to triage is well taken. However, it is not my task to discover the most 
effective means of achieving conservation aims. My goal is to determine what 
biodiversity is and how we can measure it. If I can answer that question, and show 
that biodiversity is intrinsic and measurable, then I can at least provide some insight 
into how we might define and measure biodiversity, and in doing so perhaps 
contribute to the goal of understanding what it is that we should be protecting, 
regardless of whether measuring biodiversity is part of the most efficacious proce-
dure for doing so. Biological triage is one tool for assisting me in this effort. 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 18 
2.3 Conservation value 
If we want to protect the natural world, then it must have some value. And if, as the 
concept of biological triage shows us, we want to protect some aspects of it more 
than others, then that value can, at least in a crude and relative sense, be quantified. 
What is the nature of this value and how can we measure it? Moreover, what is the 
relationship between conservation value and biodiversity? Does biodiversity 
correspond closely with one or more types of value, or is biodiversity some inde-
pendent property of which some types of natural value are manifestations? In the 
discussion that follows, I examine some types of natural value to assess whether any 
of these correspond closely with some sensible concept of biodiversity. 
Questions about the value of natural objects suggest a role for environmental ethics. 
This relatively new discipline arose in the 1970s to address ethical questions applied 
to the natural world. Since its foundation, one of the central concerns of environ-
mental ethics has been to determine the nature of environmental value. More 
specifically, can nature possess intrinsic value, value that exists independently of 
human valuers? Richard Routley devised a now famous thought experiment to 
highlight this central issue, involving a lone survivor of some human apocalypse who 
sets about a redwood grove with an axe (Routley, 1973). 
Much of the early debate concerning this question has focussed on a two-way split 
between intrinsic value and non-intrinsic value. Whereas intrinsic value exists 
independently of human valuers, non-intrinsic value does not; it is inherently 
anthropocentric. In more recent years, the so-called Callicott-Norton debate has 
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injected some much-needed clarity into the dispute by suggesting the following three-
way split:8 
1. Intrinsic value, which can exist in the absence of any conscious valuers. 
2. Instrumental value, which in some way benefits a valuer. 
3. Inherent value, which requires but does not benefit a valuer. 
Sentient creatures are considered by many people to have intrinsic value. They are 
valuable in themselves, regardless of what we think of them. My bicycle has instru-
mental value, but no intrinsic value. It has value only because it does something for 
me which I find useful. A painting is something that has inherent (as well as 
instrumental) value. The value of a painting is not intrinsic. It depends for its 
existence on a valuer. But neither is the value of a painting exclusively instrumental. 
Although a painting provides aesthetic pleasure (an instrumental value), we can also 
value a painting for itself (but not in itself). If the Uffizi gallery in Florence were 
burnt to the ground, most of us would mourn such a loss, even if we had never 
visited and never intended to visit the gallery. We therefore consider the contents of 
the Uffizi to be valuable, even though they provide us with no benefit. This value is 
clearly not instrumental (it does not confer a benefit on the user) but neither is it 
intrinsic, because it depends on valuers for its existence. In other words, it is inherent 
value. 
                              
8  Callicott (1996) is a response predominantly to Norton (1991). This three-way split does not 
correspond exactly with the views of either. In particular, Callicott makes no distinction between 
intrinsic and inherent value, and appears to use the term intrinsic when referring to what Norton calls 
inherent. While Norton makes a three-way split, his boundaries and terminology do not fully 
correspond with those used here, which are adapted from McQuillan (1998). 
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2.3.1 Intrinsic value 
Whether the non-human world has intrinsic value is somewhat controversial. Each 
of us lives a life that depends for its continued existence on the death of numerous 
organisms to provide us with a steady supply of food, clothing and various materials. 
We clearly consider such organisms to be of lesser value than a single human life. 
However, there are very sensible arguments as to why we should treat certain 
sentient creatures such as dogs, chimpanzees and dolphins with a respect akin to our 
respect for fellow humans. If humans have intrinsic value, then, according to these 
arguments, so must such sentient creatures (although perhaps in some lesser 
quantity). 
I am very sympathetic to the idea that humans have intrinsic value and that, by 
extension, some sentient creatures also have intrinsic value. However, I will not 
attempt to defend this position, because doing so would not assist me in clarifying 
the relationship between environmental ethics and biodiversity. Even if we accept 
that certain sentient creatures have intrinsic value, it is difficult to see how this can be 
used to develop a rational conservation strategy. Protecting Australia’s arid-zone 
ecosystems relies more on culling large numbers of feral rabbits, cats and foxes than 
it does on preserving individual bilbies, parrots and geckos. Any intrinsic value of 
individual organisms, even highly sentient ones, is swept aside in a bid to prevent 
whole species of endangered animals from becoming extinct. 
If we are to argue for the protection of a species on the basis of intrinsic value, then 
we require that the species possess some intrinsic value that is more than just the 
sum of the intrinsic value of its individual members (O’Neil, 1997). If we captured 
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the last remaining kakapos9 and distributed them individually to zoos around the 
world, we would extinguish their species as surely as if we had shot each one dead. 
Yet each individual kakapo might live its remaining days in splendour. Without 
devaluing each individual kakapo, we can devalue the kakapo species. 
Many people, myself included, consider intrinsic value to be rooted in sentience. 
Humans, and presumably dogs, chimpanzees and dolphins, are sentient and hence 
have intrinsic value. Species, however, are not sentient. They might consist of 
sentient individuals, but they are not in themselves a sentient being. Moreover, most 
species, such as Wollemi pines, for example, do not even consist of sentient 
individuals. Hence it is difficult to see how a species could possess the same sort of 
intrinsic value that a human or chimpanzee possesses. 
I reject the idea that a species, or indeed any natural collective, could have intrinsic 
value beyond the intrinsic value of individual sentient creatures within that collective. 
Again, I will not attempt to defend this position any further, since doing so would 
not contribute to my central thesis. However, adopting such a position has some 
significant consequences for my concept of biodiversity. Biodiversity is not a value 
measure of individual organisms. A concept of biodiversity that is useful for making 
conservation decisions must incorporate natural collectives such as species and 
ecosystems. If I accept that the value of these natural collectives is non-intrinsic, then 
I am forced to accept that the value of biodiversity is at least partially non-intrinsic. 
By adopting this position, I might be justified in relaxing the metaphysical require-
ments of a conservation-based biodiversity concept. If the value of biodiversity is 
non-intrinsic, then biodiversity itself may also be a non-intrinsic property of 
                              
9 A highly endangered flightless parrot that survives on a few small New Zealand islands. 
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biological systems. In other words, biodiversity need only reflect whatever anthropo-
centric values we wish it to include. However, the concept of biodiversity I will 
develop is metaphysically much stronger than this. It is an intrinsic property of any 
biological system. This more robust formulation of biodiversity offers several 
advantages. First, it corresponds with our intuitions. Its seems that there should be 
some independently specifiable property of biological systems that at least roughly 
correlates with the common notion of biodiversity. Secondly, it makes the concept of 
biodiversity meaningful. As I have already said, a concept of biodiversity defined only 
as “that which we wish to protect” tells us nothing we do not already know. Thirdly, 
an intrinsic definition of biodiversity offers hope that we can agree on what biodiver-
sity is and how we should measure it. If biodiversity were not some well-defined 
intrinsic feature of the world, attempts to define and measure it are prone to 
disagreement. By defining biodiversity in terms of some intrinsic property, we can 
avoid such arguments. Fourthly, such a concept of biodiversity has more political 
weight than an exclusively anthropocentric concept. Those calling for the protection 
of some socially-constructed concept of biodiversity would forever be liable to 
accusations of reinventing the concept to suit their particular political interests. 
Finally, a metaphysically strong form of biodiversity can accommodate those who do 
not wish to reject the intrinsic value of natural collectives. Indeed, for those who 
maintain that natural collectives have intrinsic value, and that biodiversity should 
correspond in some way to this value, a realist concept of biodiversity is a necessary 
prerequisite. 
2.3.2 Instrumental value 
The natural world clearly has instrumental value. It provides us with a host of 
economic benefits, in the form of foods, building materials, medicines, recreational 
activities and aesthetic pleasure. Wheat, for example, is a cash crop with significant 
economic value, as well as a foodstuff with direct utility. Trout provide a recreational 
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pursuit and echidnas aesthetic pleasure. Non-human instrumental value undoubtedly 
exists. 
If there were a clear link between biodiversity and one or more types of instrumental 
value, then quantifying biodiversity might simply require us to quantify the types of 
instrumental value we wish to protect. Some types of instrumental value are, at least 
in principle, very easy to quantify. A good approximation of the annual commodity 
value of wheat could be made by summing the total monetary value of wheat traded 
over a year. This value could then be easily compared with the commodity value of, 
say, tobacco, to determine which is more worthy of conservation. This is, however, a 
rather bizarre way of assessing biodiversity. Biodiversity is not simply about com-
modity value, but about diversity. Wheat has lots of commodity value, but few would 
suggest it constitutes significantly more biodiversity than any other species of grass. 
It is just a particularly valuable aspect of biodiversity. 
Another type of instrumental value that we could try to quantify is what we might 
loosely call aesthetic pleasure. We want to protect giant pandas, humpback whales 
and eastern bilbies because we think they are beautiful, lovable, interesting, awe-
inspiring or in some other way endearing. Exactly how we would quantify this form 
of value is far from clear. Is a naked mole rat more endearing than a yellow-footed 
rock wallaby? Not only does the answer depend on who you ask; for many individu-
als there simply is no meaningful answer. One possible solution is to measure the 
aesthetic value of any species by counting the total monetary value that the public 
would be willing to pay to prevent its extinction, or else that it would be willing to 
accept in compensation for its loss (Randall, 1986). For many people, there is 
something fundamentally hollow about this reduction of aesthetic value into a purely 
economic form. However, there is a more fundamental objection to counting 
biodiversity in terms of aesthetic value. The whole point of biodiversity as a political 
concept is that it transcends the species-by-species approach to conservation. By 
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focusing our attention exclusively on charismatic megafauna, such as giant pandas, 
highland gorillas and Sumatran tigers, we risk losing the millions of far less charis-
matic species. Most of these species have never been observed, let alone appreciated 
for their aesthetic qualities. Focussing exclusively on aesthetic value largely misses the 
point of why biodiversity is such a potentially useful concept. 
One of the central arguments for the protection of biodiversity is that it plays some 
function in maintaining healthy ecosystems. In the words of Paul Ehrlich, 
Other organisms have provided humanity with the very basis of civiliza-
tion in the form of crops, domestic animals, a wide variety of industrial 
products, and many important medicines. Nonetheless, the most impor-
tant anthropocentric reason for preserving diversity is the role that mi-
croorganisms, plants, and animals play in providing free ecosystem ser-
vices, without which society in its present form could not persist. (Ehr-
lich, 1986) 
According to Ehrlich and many other biologists, these unglamorous species of 
microorganisms, plants and animals—what Edward Wilson calls “the little things 
that run the world” (Takacs, 1996, p. 57)—provide a host of functions such as 
producing oxygen, purifying water, maintaining healthy soils and controlling pests. 
These functions are essential both to human agriculture and the maintenance of 
habitats on which humans depend. To maintain these essential functions, we must 
maintain biodiversity. Losing one spider species may not have much effect on aphid 
numbers, for example, since other spider species are available to fulfil the same 
function, but losing lots of spider species may result in insufficient aphid predation 
to keep their numbers in check. 
We could feasibly develop a concept of biodiversity based solely on a valuation of 
ecological functions—ecological-function biodiversity. Much of the value associated with 
ecological function biodiversity is what we might call indirect value. An indirect value 
depends on some other direct value for its existence. If a commercially valuable 
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timber species, for example, can only survive in the presence of some symbiotic 
fungus, then that fungus has indirect value. If we lose the fungus, we lose the 
valuable timber species. 
There are several problems with ecological-function biodiversity, both on practical 
and conceptual levels. Its main practical limitation is that we have no idea what the 
full range of essential ecological functions is, let alone which organisms provide these 
functions. Such practical difficulties, however, are not my main concern. They need 
not bar us from developing a robust concept of biodiversity, regardless of how 
impractical it would be to apply such a concept. The main conceptual difficulty with 
ecological-function biodiversity is that it does not capture much of what we want a 
biodiversity concept to capture. The charismatic megafauna on which many conser-
vationists focus, for example, provide virtually no essential ecological functions. Such 
species often occupy high trophic levels, and their numbers are, in most cases, simply 
too low to have much ecological impact. We, and the biological systems on which we 
depend, would comfortably get by without giant pandas, spotted owls and white 
rhinos. Furthermore, there are many whole ecosystems on which humans clearly do 
not depend. It is simply not true that destroying an isolated coral reef, say, would 
necessarily have a major impact on ecological functions essential to human life. Such 
an ecological system is largely autonomous from systems of human food production, 
which would therefore be largely unaffected. 
Both charismatic megafauna and isolated ecosystems should, it seems, form an 
integral part of any sensible biodiversity concept. Defining biodiversity solely in 
terms of ecological functions is therefore problematic. The maintenance of ecological 
functions might be a reason for protecting biodiversity, but it is not the only reason. 
Biodiversity, it seems, is a property too fundamental to be encompassed by ecological 
functions alone. 
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Consider another popular argument for protecting biodiversity. According to 
Edward Wilson, 
Biological diversity must be treated more seriously as a global resource, 
to be indexed, used, and above all, preserved. (Wilson, 1986, p. 3) 
This view sees biodiversity not as just a provider of ecological functions, but as a 
resource—something valuable that we should protect now so we can exploit its 
usefulness both now and in the future. The value associated with this ‘future 
usefulness’ aspect of biodiversity is what we might call ‘option value’. An option 
value derives from the values that something might possess in future. Maclaurin calls 
this the value associated with ‘hedging our bets’ (Maclaurin, 1998b, p. 174). A wild 
strain of wheat, for example, may prove to be uniquely resistant to some wheat virus 
that will emerge some time in the future. If we can exploit the beneficial properties 
of this strain, it will have enormous commercial value. At present, there is some non-
zero probability that this will happen.10 The present option value of the wheat strain 
can be thought of as the product of this probability and the value the wheat strain 
would have if the future scenario were to come true. Like indirect value, option value 
is auxiliary; it depends on other values for its existence. 
A jar full of old screws, nails and other assorted bits of hardware is an example of 
something with option value. Chances are, most of the items inside the jar will 
eventually be lost, discarded, rust away or otherwise end their lives without perform-
ing any useful function. The reason we keep them is that some of them might come 
in handy. One day we might just need that single 10 mm M3 Philips head screw, so 
we keep it just in case this situation arises. If we were somehow required to discard 
                              
10 There are numerous historical examples of wild strains or close relatives of domesticated crops 
being used to improve their commercial counterparts. Iltis (1986), for example, discusses cases 
involving tomatoes and maize. 
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half the jar’s contents, we would be forced into carrying out a form of hardware 
triage. How should we go about deciding which items to keep? One sensible rule 
would be to discard those items that have very little chance of ever being useful. A 
bent nail might fall into this category. A second rule might be to keep those items 
that would be of great value should they eventually be required, even if the probabil-
ity of this happening is relatively small. The irreplaceable spare screw for fastening 
the arms on your sunglasses might fall into this category. A third rule would be to 
cull predominantly from those items of which there are many identical or similar 
examples. If there are 27 one-inch flat head nails and you suspect you will only ever 
need three at the most, then you can safely throw away the other 24. This last rule is 
telling us to preserve the most diverse set of items, where diversity is measured with 
respect to some set of functionally useful attributes.11 
Carrying out triage with the constraint of maximising biological option value would 
mean choosing that set of biological elements that maximises the sum total of all the 
probabilistically-weighted future values of all the potentially useful resources of the 
biological world. Since in most cases we do not know which elements of the 
biological world are potentially useful resources, it makes sense to select a diversity of 
elements to increase our chances of picking the right ones. In other words, we 
should hedge our bets by picking a biodiverse set. Maximising option value means 
maximising biodiversity. 
                              
11 Defining future functionally useful attributes can be problematic. For example, on the basis of 
present knowledge, we might discard all black nails because we predict that the otherwise identical 
silver ones will be functionally identical. We might eventually find, however, that the black nails match 
a particular piece of furniture better or that their blackness was due to a nitride coating that makes 
them more corrosion resistant and therefore more suitable for certain applications. Nevertheless, it 
seems we have no choice other than to make a best guess at what we suspect are the future functional 
attributes based on our limited existing knowledge. 
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Consider a simple example. Suppose we have a set of three endangered species and 
we can only afford to spend money on conserving two of them. With all other 
considerations being equal, we should focus our efforts on those two species that 
maximise option value. Suppose two of the species are wild tomatoes and the other 
is a wild potato. In the absence of any other knowledge, our only rational strategy 
would be to select the two most dissimilar species—presumably the potato and one 
of the tomatoes. 
The main failing of option-value as way of defining or even understanding biodiver-
sity is that, like ecological-function biodiversity, it is not robust enough to capture every-
thing we want from a biodiversity concept. Option value may provide a strong 
reason for preserving biodiversity, but biodiversity does not in itself capture every 
aspect of option value. Recall that with the jar-of-hardware example, there were two 
rules other than maximising diversity. One was to discard obviously useless things 
and the other was to keep obviously useful things. Rather than rely solely on diversity 
as the criterion for selection, we should use whatever knowledge we have at our 
disposal to assist us in maximising option value. Similarly, in maximising biological 
option value, we should use present knowledge to help us assess which species will 
be useful in future. All domesticated crops, for example, are extremely useful now 
and will almost certainly remain so in future. They should therefore figure promi-
nently in any option value measure. However, wheat or any other domesticated crop 
does not appear to represent significantly more biodiversity than a host of wild 
counterparts. Hence there is an incongruity between measuring option value and 
measuring biodiversity. 
We might concede this point but argue that the lack of congruence between option 
value and biodiversity only applies to specific species such as domestic crops. Since 
we are vastly ignorant of the potential uses of most species, biodiversity remains the 
only sensible criterion for assessing the option value of such species. This is not an 
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unreasonable argument. However, it leaves us no closer to spelling out what 
biodiversity is. All we are left with is some sense of congruence between biodiversity 
and a limited form of option value without any criterion for independently determin-
ing either. If we are to formulate option value in terms of biodiversity, we need first 
to determine what biodiversity is. Alternatively, if we are to use option value to 
define biodiversity, we need to spell out ‘likely future usefulness’ in more concrete 
terms. In Chapter 3, I will discuss this issue in more detail when examining Maclau-
rin’s concept of ‘raw biodiversity’. 
Whatever the concept of biodiversity is supposed to mean, its relationship with the 
many types of instrumental value is not straightforward. Biodiversity is fundamentally 
about diversity, not instrumental value. Lineages with high instrumental value such as 
domestic wheat do not constitute significantly more biodiversity than many other 
species with low instrumental value. Conversely, taxonomically and morphologically 
distinct species such as echidnas are often thought to represent more biodiversity 
than less distinct species such as bottlenose dolphins, but do not necessarily have 
more instrumental value. Whatever our concept of biodiversity might come to 
represent, there are many forms of instrumental value that the concept will be unable 
to encompass. 
2.3.3 Inherent value 
Formulating biodiversity in terms of intrinsic value proved difficult because there is 
no straightforward way of assigning intrinsic value to the sorts of units that biodiver-
sity deals which, such as species. There is simply too much doubt over the very 
existence of such collective intrinsic value. The existence of collective instrumental 
value, on the other hand, is uncontroversial, but there is a lack of congruence 
between the various forms of instrumental value and the sort of thing we want a 
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biodiversity concept to capture. Inherent value offers a possible solution to this 
impasse. 
All of the types of instrumental value discussed above can be used to generate 
persuasive arguments for protecting the biological world. Together, however, they 
fail to capture all of our reasons for wanting to protect biodiversity. Suppose we were 
able to strip the biological world of all its instrumental value. So we might have 
machines that performed various functions such as making food, creating oxygen 
and so on, as well as artificially satisfying all recreational and aesthetic desires. We 
would also have to satisfy all option value by, for example, curing all diseases. Having 
thus satisfied all instrumental value, would it matter if we destroyed all remaining 
rainforests, coral reefs and other zones of high biodiversity? Nearly all of us, I 
suspect, regardless of whether we think the biological world can have intrinsic value, 
would unhesitatingly answer “yes”. This shows us that the biological world has some 
value that is neither intrinsic nor instrumental; in other words inherent value. 
We have a duty regarding but not necessarily to something with inherent value. A 
valued painting, for example, ought to be protected from destruction, not because we 
owe it to the painting, but because we owe it to those who value the painting. 
Similarly, we may have a duty to cull individual African elephants if that will help 
protect the species, not because we owe it to the elephants (or the species), but 
because we owe it to those who value African elephants, including ourselves if we are 
one of those people. 
The inherent value of the biological world can be expressed simply as a love of 
nature—what Edward Wilson calls biophilia; an “innate affinity for the natural world” 
(Wilson, 1984). Whether or not we possess biophilia ourselves, the existence of it 
cannot be disputed. It is empirically observable. People love nature. The sort of value 
on which biophilia is based is explicitly non-intrinsic. Without a human valuer it 
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would not exist. However, neither is it instrumental. Inherent and instrumental value 
are quite different. Instrumental value can be reduced to basic human desires, such as 
the desire to be alive rather than dead, warm rather than cold, nourished rather than 
hungry. The desire to protect that which has instrumental value can always be given a 
rational justification in terms of these more basic human desires. However, we are at 
a loss when it comes to mounting a rational argument for preserving the natural 
world once stripped of instrumental value. The residual value—inherent value—
seems to spring directly from a desire without any intermediate rational justification. 
McQuillan uses the moral philosophy of David Hume to make some sense of this 
situation. For Hume, 
Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions and can never pre-
tend to any other office than to serve and obey them. (Hume, 1978, p. 
415) 
In other words, passions such as desire are primary, while reason is secondary. Hence 
there is no justification for protecting nature’s inherent value other than our desire to 
do so. McQuillan states this position quite plainly. 
… in keeping with Hume’s privileging of passion over reason, the source 
of nature’s inherent … value lies not in its instrumentality but in the pas-
sion that we have for it. (McQuillan, 1998, p. 322) 
The sort of biodiversity concept commonly employed in environmental debates is, I 
think, deeply connected to the inherent value of nature. Citing ecosystem functions 
and cures for cancer as justifications for protecting biodiversity are weak rationalisa-
tions of a deeper passion. Hence inherent value is likely to be the best starting point 
for a conservation-based concept of biodiversity. However, this leaves me with some 
problems. I am trying to construct a metaphysically strong concept of biodiversity. I 
want biodiversity to be an intrinsic property; something that exists outside the human 
mind. Yet, the type of value that we want our biodiversity concept to best represent 
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is explicitly anthropocentric. It exists only in the human mind. Although there is no 
contradiction involved in our anthropocentric valuing of some non-anthropocentric 
property, inherent value leaves me no closer to specifying what an intrinsic concept 
of biodiversity looks like. Moreover, decomposing inherent value into simpler 
elements is problematic. Nature’s inherent value, it seems, springs forth in toto from 
some collective passion. 
Despite these problems, the type of biodiversity concept I have in mind is a good 
candidate for capturing nature’s inherent value. It at least comes close to describing 
what gives rise to my impassioned plea for protecting the rich diversity of life. Later 
on I hope to provide some justification for linking the type of biodiversity concept I 
will develop and nature’s inherent value. The justification is necessarily weak, 
however, because inherent value is not a quality that can be easily analysed. I can only 
hope that my desires correspond with yours. 
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3 Measuring biodiversity  
When you can measure what you are speaking about, and express it in numbers, you 
know something about it: but when you cannot measure it, your knowledge is of a 
meagre and unsatisfactory kind: it may be the beginning of knowledge, but you have 
scarcely, in your thoughts, advanced to the stage of science. 
 — Lord Kelvin 
It is generally acknowledged that all organic beings have been formed on two great 
laws—Unity of Type and the Conditions of Existence. By unity of type is meant that 
fundamental agreement in structure, which we see in organic beings of the same class, 
and which is quite independent of their habitats of life. On my theory, unity of type is 
explained by unity of descent. The expression of conditions of existence, so often in-
sisted upon by the illustrious Cuvier, is fully embraced by the principle of natural selec-
tion. For natural selection acts by either now adapting the varying parts of each being 
to its organic conditions of life; or by having adapted them in long-past periods of time 
… 
 — Charles Darwin 
The diversity of living forms is apparent to us all. Beetles and whales are vastly 
different creatures. Just as apparent is the unity of such forms; the extent to which 
organisms can be grouped by similarity. Virtually all multicellular organisms can 
grouped by species, and these species can in turn be organised into hierarchical 
categories. Taxonomy is the science of classifying organisms. It is a science whose 
roots extend at least as far back as Aristotle and for which parallels can be found in 
the folk taxonomies of numerous cultures. At least since Darwin, the patterns of life 
recognised by taxonomy have been explained in terms of both common descent—
Darwin’s Unity of Type—and adaptation to the environment—his Conditions of 
Existence. Interpreting the patterns of nature through the lens of these ‘two great 
laws’ has provided modern taxonomy with a powerful means of organising biological 
information. In recent years, taxonomy has in turn been used as a tool for carrying 
out what Robert May calls ‘the calculus of biodiversity’ (Takacs, 1996, p. 61). 
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The concept of actually measuring biodiversity in an apparently mathematically 
rigorous fashion has attracted some strong criticism. Daily and Ehrlich have 
described it as 
… ‘crackpot rigour’ (detailed mathematical analyses of an intractable 
problem) or ‘suboptimization’ (doing in the very best way something that 
should not be done at all). (Daily & Ehrlich, 1992) 
Ehrlich also describes it as “mental masturbation” (Takacs, 1996, p. 62). However, as 
with biological triage, these objections are largely aimed at practical rather than 
conceptual aspects of measuring biodiversity. No one doubts that attempting to 
measure biodiversity with any sort of mathematic rigour is an Herculean task. 
However, my main concern is not to address the practical aspects of measuring 
biodiversity, but simply to understand what biodiversity is, how we might measure it 
and what sort of property it might be. If I am able to demonstrate that biodiversity 
can, at least in principle, be measured in a mathematically rigorous fashion, then I 
have taken a large step towards understanding what biodiversity is and perhaps 
showing that it is an intrinsic property of biological systems. However, before I look 
at taxonomic approaches to measuring biodiversity, I need to consider the aims and 
methodologies of taxonomy itself. 
3.1 A tale of three taxonomies 
In recent decades, the science of taxonomy has undergone significant change as 
competing approaches to the taxonomic classification of organisms have been 
advocated (Hull, 1988). Each approach can generally be classified under one of three 
labels—evolutionary taxonomy, phenetics and cladistics. These three approaches 
differ markedly, not just in the classifications they produce, but in their aims, 
methodologies and philosophical outlooks. These differences must therefore be 
examined in order to understand the biodiversity measures to which they give rise. 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 35 
3.1.1 Evolutionary taxonomy 
Modern evolutionary taxonomy is a system that combines elements of evolutionary 
thinking with aspects of the Linnean and other systems of classification that predate 
the Darwinian revolution. The traditional element of evolutionary taxonomy is the 
recognition that similarities between organisms allow them to be grouped and ranked 
to form a nested hierarchy of taxa. Thus a highly similar population of interbreeding 
organisms are grouped into a species (e.g. Homo sapiens), several highly similar species 
are grouped into a genus (e.g. Homo), several genera into a family (Hominidae) and so 
on through the ascending levels of order, class, phylum and kingdom. The notion of 
common ancestry central to modern Darwinian thinking later explained these 
patterns of similarity and diversity among organisms, thus allowing pre-Darwinian 
taxonomy to be reinterpreted within this Darwinian context without undergoing 
radical change. 
The main feature of evolutionary taxonomy is its attempt to classify and rank 
organisms on the basis of two criteria: 
1. phylogenetic branching (i.e. the relationships between species in respect of 
common ancestry), and 
2. the degree and type of evolutionary change between branching points. 
In other words, the evolutionary taxonomist attempts to group organisms on the 
basis of both ancestry and morphology. 
In recent decades, evolutionary taxonomy has been heavily criticised and largely 
replaced by alternative systematic techniques (Hull, 1988). One of the central 
criticisms is that evolutionary taxonomy attempts to classify organisms on the basis 
of two incompatible criteria: phylogeny and morphology. Although these two criteria 
often produce congruent classifications, frequently they do not. Similarity often 
belies ancestry. For example, there is significant morphological (and ecological) 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 36 
affinity between tuataras and lizards, despite their closest common ancestor predating 
the divergence of lizard and snake lineages. Deciding how to classify organisms in 
such cases can be unclear. Should tuataras be classified as primitive lizards or 
something completely different to either lizards or snakes? An evolutionary taxono-
mist is forced to decide such questions by using some arbitrary weighting of both 
morphological and phylogenetic factors. Because of this ‘intuitive’ approach to 
classification, the methods of evolutionary taxonomy are almost impossible to codify 
explicitly. Instead they are developed over many years of experience. Although 
different taxonomists working in the same area tend to reach general agreement in 
their classifications, problems arise when attempts are made to explicitly justifying 
these classifications, teach the methods used to derive them, or apply the methods 
used in one class or phylum to another.  
3.1.2 Phenetics 
In response to some of the problems posed by evolutionary taxonomy, an alternative 
classificatory scheme known as phenetics12 was developed in the early 1960s, princi-
pally by Sokal and Sneath (Hull, 1988). Unlike the ‘intuitive’ approach used by 
evolutionary taxonomists, pheneticists use a standardised classificatory procedure 
based on quantitative techniques to measure the degree of ‘overall similarity’ among 
groups of organisms. The similarity measure employed is based on the presence or 
absence of numerous unweighted characters or character states. 
By using a standardised quantitative technique, pheneticists hoped to remove 
subjectivity and ambiguity from taxonomy. Although some convergent or highly 
variable characters might obscure the observed pattern, reproducible results, it was 
                              
12 Also referred to as numerical phenetics or numerical taxonomy. 
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claimed, should arise whenever sufficient characters are used for analysis. However, 
such hopes have proved unfounded, leading to the abandonment of phenetic 
techniques of classification (de Queiroz & Good, 1997; Hull, 1988). The calculated 
degree of similarity between any two organisms depends on which characters are 
measured. So, for example, cuttlefish and rabbits could be classified as similar on the 
basis that both have two eyes, can be kept as pets, and are found on restaurant 
menus in provincial France. Furthermore, significant morphological differences 
frequently exist between different members of a single polymorphic species.13 A 
purely phenetic classification would necessarily classify these organisms into separate 
taxa. The infinity of similarities and differences between any two organisms means 
that the use of more characters cannot, on its own, guarantee a stable classification. 
The hope that phenetic measures would converge on a single classificatory scheme 
by including more characters has proved false. Hence the objective ‘theory-free’ 
approach of phenetics has proved ill-founded, since some theory must be introduced 
to decide which characters are relevant and which are not (Hull, 1988). 
Despite its problems, phenetics represents a positive step towards separating the two 
divergent aims of evolutionary taxonomy. In grouping organisms only by morpho-
logical similarity, a phenetic classification eschews any claims about ancestry.14 
Furthermore, by demonstrating the limitations of evolutionary taxonomy and 
employing mathematical analysis to classification, phenetics proved highly influential 
on a third approach to classification, an approach that has come to be known as 
cladistics. 
                              
13 For example, caterpillars and butterflies, or even males and females of many species such as garfish 
(Hull, 1988).  
14 An implicit hope of many pheneticists, however, was that a purely phenetic classification would 
nevertheless reveal ancestral patterns. 
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3.1.3 Cladistics 
Like phenetics, cladistics also recognises the conflicting aims of evolutionary 
taxonomy in trying to capture both phylogenetic and morphological affinity. With 
cladistics, however, this conflict is resolved by focusing on the phylogenetic compo-
nent. The central idea of cladistics is that systematics represents evolutionary history; 
the job of the taxonomist is to deduce the phylogenetic relationships among 
organisms, not their morphological similarities. Cladistics makes a further metaphysi-
cal claim that real taxonomic units are necessarily the monophyletic groups. A mono-
phyletic group is one for which all and only the descendants of a single ancestral 
species are members.15 Thus the cetaceans are a monophyletic group, since all 
cetaceans share a common ancestor that was not the ancestor for any other living 
organism. In contrast, the monkeys are paraphyletic, since there was no common 
ancestor of all monkeys that was not also an ancestor of the apes, while the cyano-
bacteria are polyphyletic, since this grouping consists of an assemblage of organisms 
that evolved common traits independently. 
As with phenetics, the methodology of cladistics is based on trait analysis. Only 
certain types of traits, however, are informative for constructing evolutionary history. 
A unique trait possessed by only one species gives no information about that species’ 
relationship with other species. Similarly, a primitive trait that was inherited by all 
members of a particular group gives no information about the relationships within 
that group, although at a higher level in the tree, it may help infer the relationships 
linking the entire group with other groups. The only type of traits that are informa-
tive in cladistic analysis are derived traits; ones that vary within a group. 
                              
15 The monophyletic group consisting of an organism and all of its descendants is known as a ‘clade’. 
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In cladistic analysis, species are linked on the basis of shared derived traits. If species 
A and B possess a certain trait, and species C does not, then A and B are likely to be 
more closely related to one another than either is to C. Of course, this may not be 
the case. C may be more closely related to B than either is to A, either because C lost 
the trait that the common ancestor of A, B and C all shared, or because A and B 
evolved the trait independently. These possibilities are illustrated in the ‘cladograms’ 
of Figure 1 below. 
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Figure 1: Cladistics infers phylogeny from character analysis. In the data, ‘1’ 
indicates the possession of a particular trait, whereas ‘0’ indicates its ab-
sence. In the absence of other information, the true phylogenetic relation-
ships are more likely to correspond to (a) than (b), since (a) requires fewer 
character state changes; i.e., it is more parsimonious (after Sober, 1988). 
In cladistic analysis, we decide between the two competing hypotheses of ancestry 
illustrated in Figure 1 by choosing the most ‘parsimonious’ cladogram; that is, the 
one that requires the fewest character state changes. The hypothesis represented by 
Figure 1a requires the assumption only that a single character state change occurred 
somewhere along the lineage that gave rise to A and B, whereas that represented by 
Figure 1b requires the assumption of at least two character state changes, with the 
two possible ways in which such changes could have occurred illustrated. Figure 1a is 
therefore more parsimonious than 1b. In practice, numerous character state changes 
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are possible, and hence the most parsimonious cladogram will not always reflect true 
ancestral relationships. Nevertheless, such a methodology reflects a ‘best guess’ 
inference of such relationships on the basis of available evidence. Moreover, the 
inclusion of additional data into the analysis can help resolve such discrepancies, 
resulting in convergence towards a single, stable classification (Patterson, 1977). 
The key advantage of cladistics over both evolutionary taxonomy and phenetics is 
that its central aim is clearly defined. This aim is to ascertain knowledge of the ‘one 
true tree of life’; the phylogenetic relationships among existing organisms. The 
existence of such a tree is uncontroversial. In contrast, the notion of ‘biological 
similarity’ that both evolutionary taxonomists and pheneticists try to measure has yet 
to be clearly defined. Cladistics avoids this problem by reformulating the role of 
biological similarity. Rather than using similarity to define taxonomic affinity, 
cladistics uses taxonomic affinity, defined phylogenetically, to explain similarity. In 
other words, cladistics has removed similarity from a classificatory role and made it 
part of taxonomy’s explanatory agenda. 
Cladistics is not without its methodological problems. However, the achievements of 
cladistics are more than just methodological. It has clearly established phylogenetics 
as the central aim of taxonomy, giving rise to what is now commonly referred to as 
‘phylogenetic systematics’. Once agreement has been established about the funda-
mental aim of taxonomy, many mathematical methods for estimating phylogeny 
other than parsimony analysis become permissible (even phenetics). Once derided as 
a higher form of stamp collecting, taxonomy has now secured a central position in 
the biological sciences. It can no longer be seen as simply collecting and classifying 
the gifts of a benevolent creator to impose an order upon nature’s untidiness, but as 
a means for compiling detailed knowledge of earth’s evolutionary history. Taxonomic 
data now play an important role in resolving important theoretical and conceptual 
issues in biology, such as in understanding the notion of evolutionary constraint 
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central to debates over ‘adaptationism’.16 Taxonomy is also pivotal to the biodiversity 
question, because it is taxonomy on which existing biodiversity measures are based.  
3.2 Taxonomic biodiversity 
In recent years, a relatively rich literature has been produced concerning the taxo-
nomic measurement of biodiversity. There are several motivations for constructing a 
measure of biodiversity. One is to demonstrate that biodiversity is a robust concept; 
defining what biodiversity is through the development of a well-defined measure-
ment procedure. A more practical motivation is the development of procedures to 
assist conservation decision-making, such as which regions of a forested area to 
protect from logging. This may involve developing not just a technique of biodiver-
sity measurement, but also things like optimisation procedures for area-selection.17 
Given the difficulties we have already encountered in trying to define a precise 
notion of biodiversity, it is perhaps unsurprising that there exists a variety of 
taxonomic biodiversity measures; there is simply not yet enough agreement about 
such fundamental questions as what biodiversity is. Hence many of the differences 
between measures arise because their target properties differ—they are trying to 
measure different things. Biodiversity measures also differ in many instances because 
they are based on different indicators.18 Measuring biodiversity is not just conceptually 
but also practically difficult, and so some other property is often measured that, 
                              
16 See, for example, Gould & Lewontin (1978), Dennett (1995) and Sterelny & Griffiths (1999). 
17 A key notion here is complementarity. A region is more worthy of protection if it not only has high 
biodiversity; but also contains species not already contained in other protected regions. 
18 Sarkar (1999) introduces the terms surrogate (or true surrogate) and estimator surrogate in this context. For 
Sarkar, an estimator surrogate is akin to what I call an indicator, whereas a true surrogate is a target 
property that supposedly represents ‘overall biodiversity’. Sarkar presupposes that ‘biodiversity’ is an 
ill-defined concept, not reducible to a single target property. I eschew this terminology because it is 
unnecessarily confusing for my purposes. 
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hopefully, is a good indicator of a more fundamental target property (true biodiversity). 
In the remainder of this section, I will give an overview of the various types of 
taxonomic biodiversity measure. 
3.2.1 Species richness 
In Chapter 1, we met the concept of ‘species richness’19, which is simply the number 
of species within a particular area or ecosystem. Although species richness is often 
used as a crude definition of biodiversity, most biologists think it is simply an 
indicator of some more fundamental property (Takacs, 1996). The main limitations 
of species richness as a biodiversity measure have already been discussed. Measuring 
the species richness of an assemblage accounts only for the number of species, and 
not how much those species might differ from one another. Beetle species are 
numerous and in many cases highly similar, whereas whale species are few and 
relatively disparate. Red wolves attract considerable conservation effort, despite their 
status as a mere subspecies. It is generally accepted that an ideal biodiversity measure 
should somehow account for these differences between species, and not just sum 
them with equal weighting. 
Despite such limitations, there are many good reasons for retaining species richness 
as a biodiversity measure. Gaston (1996, pp.78–79) lists five. 
1. Species richness can be correlated to many measures of ecological diversity 
and it functions better than most other potential indicators including species 
diversity. 
                              
19 ‘Species diversity’ is sometimes defined as a different measure that also accounts for the relative 
abundance of different species (Sarkar, 1999). 
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2. There is usually a positive correlation between species richness and higher 
taxon richness (see following section), allowing the latter to be used as a good 
indicator of species richness. 
3. When species richness is relatively high, it is correlated with character rich-
ness. 
4. Some parameters used to measure the complexity of community webs (in-
cluding the number of edges and the length of directed paths) seem to be 
correlated with species richness. (This remains somewhat controversial.) 
5. Relatively high species richness is correlated with increasing topographic 
diversity. This is only to be expected insofar as topographic diversity not only 
potentially allows more niches but also may encourage reproductive isolation 
and speciation. 
Given these advantages, as well as its conceptual simplicity,20 species richness 
remains the most prevalent measure of biodiversity. 
3.2.2 Higher taxon richness 
Higher taxa are the various groupings of species that form the hierarchical classifica-
tions of taxonomy; the genera, families, orders, classes, phyla and kingdoms inherited 
from the Linnean system. Measuring higher taxon richness is analogous to measuring 
species richness, but carried out at a higher level of the taxonomic hierarchy. There 
are two clear advantages to such an approach. One is that higher taxa are less 
numerous and easier to distinguish than individual species, making them an easier 
sampling unit in field surveys. A second is that such ‘coarse graining’ partly avoids 
the problem of counting each member of speciose taxa as a single unit of biodiver-
sity, regardless of their degree of similarity (Williams & Gaston, 1994). 
                              
20 Although a single species definition has proved elusive (Mallet, 1995; Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999), 
particular species are, at least outside the microbial world (Sogin & Hinkle, 1996), typically well-
defined. As mentioned in Chapter 1, however, species from diverse clades are not necessarily 
commensurate. 
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A serious problem with using higher taxon richness as a measure of biodiversity is 
that higher taxa are not robustly defined. Cladistics enables us to organise species 
into a nested hierarchy of monophyletic groups, but it offers no advice on where to 
draw the boundaries between genera, families or any other higher taxonomic rank. 
From a cladistic perspective, these higher taxa make little sense. There is simply no 
well-defined notion of ‘evolutionary divergence’ for determining whether a particular 
monophyletic group of species constitutes a genus, a family or an order (Sterelny & 
Griffiths, 1999). 
Despite this problem, there are nevertheless some conventions, albeit not always 
well-defined ones, which are used to delineate higher taxa. Such conventions are 
typically based on morphological disparity; just the sort of target property that we 
might want a biodiversity measure to capture. The suitability of higher taxon diversity 
is further supported by empirical evidence that it provides a good indicator for more 
detailed morphological measures based on ‘character richness’, as discussed below 
(Williams & Humphreys, 1996). 
3.2.3 Genetic diversity 
Biodiversity is commonly held to be manifest at three levels: genes, species and 
ecosystems. Genetic diversity is the lowest of these levels. Advocates of this type of 
biodiversity typically make either a weak or strong claim regarding the status of 
genetic diversity. The weak claim is that genetic diversity provides a simple and 
practical indicator of biodiversity. The strong claim is that genetic diversity is the 
fundamental unit of biodiversity. 
Advocating the utility of genetic diversity measures is not without foundation. DNA 
is operationally useful. Base pairs are discrete and easily counted units that can be 
compared across widely different species. Moreover, there is evidence to support the 
use of genetic distance as an indicator of phenotypic diversity (Templeton, 1994; 
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O’Donnell et al., 1994; Williams & Humphries, 1996) and hence for the substitution 
of genetic distance for phylogenetic distance in taxonomic distinctness measures 
(Crozier, 1992). 
Nevertheless, there are substantial problems with using genetic diversity to measure 
phenotypic diversity. Primary among these is the lack of any simple mapping 
between DNA structures and phenotypic outcomes. In most organisms, most of the 
genome does not code for protein structures, whereas some portions of the genome 
may code for multiple traits. Small changes in DNA structure can lead to massive 
phenotypic change, while relatively large genetic changes such as reversals, transloca-
tions or allopolyploidy can lead to trivial phenotypic change. Determining the 
outcome of a genetic change in order to meaningfully define genetic distance requires 
some sort of ‘reading back’ from the phenotypic and other higher levels. These 
observations undermine the assumption that the probability of a character state 
change is linearly related to genetic distance. Hence genetic distance is at best an 
unreliable indicator of phylogenetic distance. 
The second and stronger approach to using genetic diversity is to claim it as a more 
fundamental form of biodiversity of which phenotypic and ecosystem diversity are 
simply manifestations. Harper and Hawkworth (1994), for example, claim that: 
Unlike higher taxa which may be based on characters which are not nec-
essarily comparable, the DNA and RNA found in all living cells can pro-
vide a basis on which to make direct comparisons between diverse or-
ganisms. There is a sense in which the biodiversity of a community is ex-
pressed as the sum of the variety of genetic information coded within the 
genotypes of the inhabitants. A biodiversity calculus could be envisaged 
for which we ask of the various species (and individuals) in a community 
how many new base sequences they contribute to the genetic vocabulary 
of the whole. (p. 8) 
In a similar vein, Mallet (1996) asserts that: 
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Biodiversity consists of the variety of morphology, behaviour, physiol-
ogy, and biochemistry in living things. Underlying this phenotypic diver-
sity is a diversity of genetic blueprints, nucleic acids that specify pheno-
types and direct their development. (p. 13) 
This stronger thesis relies on the notion that phenotypes can in some sense be 
reduced to their genotypes. The points already made against genetic diversity as an 
operational measure undercut this argument. Without rehearsing in detail the debate 
over ‘genetic reductionism’21, an additional point taken from this debate, namely the 
parity thesis, weakens it further. It is well known that many factors other than the 
genome are necessary for embryonic development. Whatever can be said about the 
causal and informational roles of genes in development can also be said about 
epigenetic factors (Oyama, 1985; Griffiths & Gray, 1994). Cell membranes, methyla-
tion patterns, parental instruction and a host of other essential developmental 
resources are transmitted from parent to offspring in much the same manner as 
genetic resources. Genotypes do not define their phenotypes any more than do 
epigenetic factors, and hence genetic diversity is no more fundamental than pheno-
typic diversity. 
Another reason we might reject genetic diversity as the fundamental unit of biodiver-
sity is that genetic diversity is just not the sort of thing we care about. We might 
marvel at the blue feet of a blue-footed booby, but few of us would get too excited 
about the alleles that produce this blueness. Preserving a particular species may 
require us to maintain a certain degree of genetic diversity, but this is a property we 
need only satisfy, not one we want to maximise for its own sake. However, this 
argument does not rule out biodiversity being some fundamental property that we do 
                              
21 See, for example, Sterelny and Griffiths (1999) for a recent summary. 
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not value in its own right, but which is nonetheless something worth preserving 
because we value its consequences. 
3.2.4 Phylogenetic diversity measures 
Phylogenetic diversity measures are based on the observation that more distantly 
related species tend to be more distinct in terms of their morphological or other 
characters. They therefore use relatedness as a criterion for assessing what weighting 
each species should be given. Atkinson sums up the rationale behind this approach. 
… given two threatened taxa, one a species not closely related to other 
living species, it seems reasonable to give priority to the taxonomically 
distinct form. (Atkinson, 1989) 
There are two basic strategies for measuring phylogenetic diversity. One strategy, as 
exemplified by Vane-Wright et al. (1991), is to define a procedure for calculating the 
relative weights for each taxon within a set of taxa. The weight of a taxon is akin to the 
value of that taxon. If we were then to use this information to carry out triage, we 
would give highest priority to protecting those taxa with the greatest weights. The 
second approach, as exemplified by Faith (1992), is to define a procedure for 
calculating the weights, not of individual taxa, but of subsets of the main set of taxa. 
Hence if we were to use this information to carry out triage, we would first ask how 
many taxa we are able to protect, and then select the subset of this size with the 
greatest total weight. This approach recognises the conservation value of a taxon as 
being context-dependent; it varies depending on which other taxa are being consid-
ered for protection. In other words, it accounts for complementarity. 
Maclaurin (1998b) introduces a nice analogy to illustrate the differences between 
these two strategies. Suppose we liken two followers of each of the above two 
strategies to stamp collectors. The first Maclaurin labels ‘the investor’, and the 
second he labels ‘the enthusiast’ (p. 144). The investor is interested only in the value 
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of her collection, whereas the enthusiast is interested only in its completeness. The 
difference between them is best exemplified when the two collectors are given the 
opportunity to buy a large number of rare but similar stamps. The investor will buy 
as many of them as she can afford. Since they are all rare, they will all increase the 
value of her collection. The enthusiast, on the other hand, will buy only a few. He 
cares only about the completeness of his collection. Once he has bought enough to 
satisfy completeness, the remaining stamps on offer are of less value to him. 
Applying this analogy to phylogenetic measures of biodiversity, the investor strategy 
would have us save both species of tuatara. They are both rare and both valuable. 
The enthusiast strategy, on the other hand, would have us save at least one species of 
tuatara. Once we have secured its future, saving the other species is of less impor-
tance.22 
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Figure 2: Phylogenetic biodiversity measures. (a) Equal weighting for sister 
groups. Column W lists the weighting applied to each species, which equals 
the aggregate weighting of its sister group. (b) Taxonomic distinctness. Col-
umn I lists the number of clades to which each species belongs, the normal-
ised reciprocals of which are used to determine each weighting (after Vane-
Wright et al., 1991). 
                              
22 In practice, however, trying to protect both species of tuatara may be the best strategy for securing 
the future of at least one species. 
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Figure 2 above shows two phylogenetic diversity measures of the investor type, 
introduced by Vane-Wright et al. (1991). These are labelled ‘equal weighting for sister 
groups’ and ‘taxonomic distinctness’. 
In cladistics, sister groups are two clades separated by a single speciation event. So in 
Figure 1a, the clade consisting solely of the species C is the sister group of the clade 
consisting of species A and B, while the clades formed by A and B are themselves 
sister groups. The phylogenetic diversity measure based on equal weighting for sister 
groups considers sister groups to be of equal importance. So if we could only afford 
to preserve two species from A, B and C in Figure 1a, we would preserve C and 
either A or B. Figure 2a illustrates this procedure for a more complicated cladogram. 
The two most closely related species are first given a weighting of one, giving a total 
weighting of two for the clade they comprise. The sister group to this clade is also 
given a weighting of two, and so on down the cladogram. 
The principal objection to applying equal weighting to sister groups is that it seems 
to weight phylogenetically distinct species too heavily (Vane-Wright et al., 1991; May, 
1994; Maclaurin, 1998b). The coelacanth,23 for example, is the sister group of a large 
clade that includes all terrestrial vertebrates. According to a biodiversity measure that 
applies equal weighting to sister groups, coelacanths are more valuable than every 
species of mammal, bird, lizard and frog combined. Vane-Wright et al. (1991) offer 
an alternative weighting scheme of ‘taxonomic distinctness’ that avoids this problem, 
as shown in Figure 2b. In this system, each species is assigned a number correspond-
ing to the number of clades of which it is a member. These numbers express the 
‘information content’ represented by each branch of the cladogram; in other words, 
                              
23 A rare and highly unusual species of lobe-fined fish found near the Comoros Islands, between 
Africa and Madagascar, and recently discovered off the coast of Sulawesi in Indonesia. 
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the number of visible speciation events24 between the ancestor of the entire group 
and the species in question. The weighting for each species is then the reciprocal of 
this number, normalised to some arbitrary total. This system has several advantages 
over the ‘equal weight for sister groups’ strategy. One is that species of equal 
taxonomic rank are given equal weighting. Another is that groups with many species 
have a higher aggregate weight than sister groups with fewer species, avoiding the 
problem of excessive weighting of phylogenetically distinct species. 
The basic approach of enthusiast-strategy phylogenetic diversity measures is to take 
the cladogram for the set of taxa in question, apply a weight (length) to each branch 
according to some rationale regarding ‘evolutionary distance’, and then select the 
subset of taxa that maximises overall intervening branch length (Humphries et al., 
1995). Figures 3–5 illustrates this procedure. Three cladograms of ten taxa are 
shown, with branch lengths weighted using different criteria. The subsets of three 
taxa with maximum intervening branch length are highlighted. 
The three weighting schemes typically used to determine evolutionary distance are: 
Clock model: Branch lengths are weighted chronologically. Evolutionary change is 
assumed to occur at a constant rate along each lineage (Figure 3). 
                              
24 Visible in the sense that they are represented by extant species. 
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Figure 3: Clock model of branch weighting (after Humphries et al., 1995). 
Sample model: Branch lengths are weighted by extrapolating from some sample of 
character state change data (typically genetic or morphological). Evolutionary change 
is assumed to occur at varying rates, as represented by the character state change data 
(Figure 4). 
 
Figure 4: Sample model of branch weighting (after Humphries et al., 1995). 
Saltatory model: Branch lengths are weighted by the number of intervening 
speciation events. A fixed amount of evolutionary change is assumed to be associated 
with each speciation event (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5: Saltatory model of branch weighting (after Humphries et al., 1995). 
All three of the above weighting schemes have been developed to cope with the 
central problem of such phylogenetic diversity measures; the sheer quantity of data 
required to accurately determine branch length. However, none of the three 
weighting schemes is without its own difficulties. Clearly, rates of evolution have 
varied greatly over time. Such morphologically diverse species as whales and goats 
diverged from a common ancestor only a few tens of millions of years ago, while 
over similar time scales, ‘living fossils’ such as coelacanths and Wollemi pines have 
undergone almost no evolutionary change. Only the sample model has some hope of 
adequately accounting for this problem, although the quantity of data required is in 
many cases still prohibitive. 
The sample model of measuring phylogenetic distance also goes under the name of 
‘character richness’. Figure 6 provides a further illustration of this approach, based 
on the original method developed by Faith (1992). In this example, the character 
state change data are superimposed onto the branches of the cladogram where such 
state changes are inferred to have occurred. The subset of, say, four organisms with 
the greatest proportion of total character richness can then be found by choosing the 
spanning path connecting four organisms that intersects the most character state 
changes (as well as speciation events, in Faith’s example). 
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Figure 6: Another phylogenetic biodiversity measure based on character 
richness. (a) A cladogram on which has been superimposed the inferred 
character state changes. (b) The most diverse set of four species is that 
which includes the most character state changes and speciation events, as 
shown (after Faith, 1992). 
Of the various approaches to measuring biodiversity examined so far, character 
richness appears to come closest to a sort of universal biodiversity measure that 
accounts for variation both within and between species. Measures based on species 
and higher-taxa may provide good indicators of biodiversity, but they do not fully 
capture the desired target property, if only because they fail to adequately account for 
the degree of difference between species. A measure that does take such degrees of 
difference into account must be based on a smaller currency unit; a unit such as 
character. 
We can either interpret character richness as the true currency of biodiversity—the 
target property we want to measure—or as an indicator of some more fundamental 
target property yet to be specified. Faith, for example, adopts the former position, 
although he is by no means alone (e.g. Vane-Wright et al., 1991; Williams & Hum-
phreys, 1996). According to Faith, 
[the] fundamental level of organismal variation corresponds to features 
or attributes of species. When biodiversity is defined at this level, the oft-
stated conservation goal of ‘protecting biodiversity’ translates into pro-
tecting as much of this feature-diversity as possible. (Faith, 1994, p. 46) 
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Faith’s rationale for this stance is that feature diversity corresponds to option value, 
as defined by 
an attempt to keep options open, for realizing values of species in future, 
by saving as much biodiversity as possible now. (p. 46) 
If we want to maximise option value, we should, according to Faith, maximise 
feature diversity, since  
the greater the number of different features represented by a protected 
subset of taxa, the greater the option value. (p. 46) 
So the important attribute of biodiversity that we call ‘distinctness’25 is rooted in 
character richness, not the other way around. How distinct a species is from other 
species will depend on the sort of characters it has and the degree to which these 
characters are unique or otherwise differ from those of other species. Measures of 
biodiversity based on character richness are a sensible way of quantifying distinct-
ness, but it is the character richness itself that we are interested in. 
Despite its attractions, there are several reasons why we might reject character 
richness as a target property. One major reason is that ‘characters’, ‘traits’ or 
‘features’ are simply not well-defined. What exactly counts as a trait? Moreover, does 
it make sense to describe an organism by simply reducing it to a collection of traits? 
The debate over adaptationism (Gould & Lewontin, 1978) clearly demonstrates the 
difficulties with such a notion. Because organisms are highly integrated systems, 
delineating one trait from another is problematic. Even when certain organs can be 
delineated, should we think of them as a single trait or a collection of traits? In other 
words, should a character richness measure apply more weight to a highly complex 
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trait such as an eye than to a relatively simple trait such as skin colour? And how 
should a character richness measure account for variations within traits across groups 
of organisms? Given that lungs in terrestrial vertebrates are homologous to swim 
bladders in teleost fishes, do we count lungs and swim bladders as a single trait or as 
two different traits? There is a strong intuition that the evolution of some characters 
such as lungs is highly significant, whereas the evolution of others, such as a new skin 
colour, is of little significance (Müller, 1991). 
Given these problems, it seems that character richness is not a robust property. 
Despite its distinctly cladistic origins, it sets out to quantify biodiversity in largely 
phenetic terms, where something like ‘overall similarity’ or ‘overall distinctness’ is 
assessed in terms of character state changes. The same criticisms that were levelled at 
phenetics similarly apply in a more limited form to character richness. In particular, 
we need to determine what counts as a character, and how characters can be 
compared with one another. 
May (1994) offers an alternative target property of phylogenetic diversity measures; a 
property termed ‘independent evolutionary history’ (IEH). Under this view, phyloge-
netic diversity is not a measure of the richness of character state changes, but of 
evolutionary history. Many historical human artefacts are valuable. This is partly due to 
their rarity, but also in part because of what they tell us about the past. A 16th 
century map, for example, is valuable in part because it says something about the way 
people thought about the world in the 16th century. Organisms also tell us some-
thing about the past. They have a history that has been shaped by evolution. A 
character state change tells us something not only about the way an organism is today 
but about the evolutionary history of its lineage. One species represents an historical 
                                                                                                                                     
25 Although ‘distinctness’ is usually thought of morphologically, behavioural or biochemical forms of 
distinctness are also recognised as important.  
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record of long dead organisms, and the more phylogenetically distinct it is, the more 
it tells us. 
Knowing something about evolutionary history does have some utility. For example, 
knowing that teosinte and domestic maize shared a recent common ancestor tells us 
that wild strains of teosinte can probably be crossed with strains of domestic maize to 
improve crop yields. Nevertheless, the value associated with independent evolution-
ary history seems predominantly like inherent value. Our desire to preserve evolu-
tionary history is largely akin to our desire to preserve a 16th century map. Both 
stem, in large part, from some irreducible passion. 
Despite this limitation, many of the phylogenetic diversity measures discussed above 
appear to bring us closer to capturing what we want from a true measure of biodiver-
sity. Measures such as character richness appear to match many of our intuitions 
about biodiversity: that its unit of currency is smaller than individual species, that it 
encompasses diversity not only between but within species, and that it corresponds 
to something like the overall richness of biological structure. Nevertheless, none of 
these measures, character richness included, seems to fully capture what we want 
biodiversity to mean. Biodiversity remains an elusive concept. 
All of the measures of biodiversity discussed above have been developed by 
biologists. Unsurprisingly then, there is an emphasis on the practicality and useful-
ness of these measures, and a lack of serious philosophical investigation into the 
metaphysical foundation of biodiversity itself. The main objective of my project is to 
fill this gap. Maclaurin (1998b) also addresses this problem. In doing so, Maclaurin 
proposes and develops a novel concept of biodiversity; a concept which he labels 
‘raw biodiversity’.  
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3.3 Raw biodiversity 
Maclaurin’s concept of raw biodiversity is intended to achieve two things. On one 
hand it is intended to measure option value; the value associated with ‘hedging our 
bets’ (p. 175). On the other hand, it is intended to avoid the arbitrary nature of 
existing biodiversity definitions; to make biodiversity a non-anthropocentrically 
defined feature of the world. Maclaurin therefore defines it as the 
… notion of diversity … not based upon antecedent beliefs about what 
it is that makes a property or an entity valuable [nor] upon antecedent 
beliefs about what it is that makes a property or an entity scientifically 
important. So you might think of this as diversity without reference to 
the value or importance of properties or entities. (p. 175) 
Hence raw biodiversity should both maximise option value and incorporate a range 
of properties without regard to how important we think they might be. 
Many biologists’ and conservationists’ notions of biodiversity correspond to 
something like raw biodiversity—an all-encompassing concept that encapsulates 
every possible aspect of biological variety. However, there is a problem concerning 
its dual definition that I need first to dispel before looking at the concept in more 
detail. Maclaurin assumes a congruence between a biodiversity measure that maxi-
mises option value and one not based on antecedent beliefs about which properties 
are important or valuable. Such a congruence has not been demonstrated, and there 
are good reasons for rejecting it. 
Recall that when culling from my jar of assorted hardware in Chapter 2, I was forced 
to make decisions about what to keep and what to discard in a way that would 
maximise option value. I concluded that a rational strategy would be first to discard 
those items that were unlikely to be useful in future, and to keep those that were 
more likely to be useful. The notion of likely future usefulness was based on what we 
know about the sort of properties that we think might be important, so my strategy 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 58 
was not completely bereft of such considerations. It may well be that these properties 
do not fully correspond to the sort of properties that are eventually important. So the 
black nail I discarded because it was otherwise identical to the silver ones may 
eventually prove to have a useful property, namely blackness, despite my considering 
such a property unimportant on the basis of present knowledge. Nevertheless, option 
value can only ever be a ‘best guess’ of likely future value. We know that some 
properties are important, so it seems sensible to give them a greater weight than 
properties whose importance we can only guess at. In other words, whatever 
knowledge we currently have about what sorts of properties are important is a vital 
component of option value. The lack of knowledge under which an option value 
assessment must be made need only be partial, not complete. Wheat is valuable now 
and will almost certainly be valuable in future, so it has lots of option value. Yet this 
option value has everything to do with what we think of and are able to do with 
wheat. Although option value may correlate to some extent with some non-
anthropocentric property of the biosphere on which some robust concept of 
biodiversity is based, option value cannot be congruent with such a property. 
Henceforth I will consider raw biodiversity only in its second guise; as an all-
encompassing concept that includes biological variety at many levels, without 
consideration of why we think such variety is important. As will be shown in 
Chapter 5, such a definition more closely corresponds to the sort of biodiversity 
concept that I, as well as many biologists and conservationists, seek—a robust 
intrinsic property of the world that encompasses many levels of organisation. Such 
notions of biodiversity typically ignore option value, and where option value is 
included (e.g. Kunin & Lawton, 1996), typically treat it as a secondary argument for 
protecting biodiversity, not as a definition of what biodiversity is. 
Maclaurin clearly rules out the possibility of a theory-free concept of biodiversity. 
Any two objects are both similar and different with respect to infinite sets of 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 59 
properties. Regardless of their differences, they may share any number of ‘abundant 
properties’ such as ‘being 4.2±1.7 light years from Proxima Centauri’. Regardless of the 
number of similarities between the two objects, such abundant properties can be 
used to construct an equal or greater number of differences. Hence measuring the 
degree of diversity among a set of objects requires that we introduce some means of 
limiting what counts as a property. Maclaurin explores three ways of achieving this, 
which give rise to three types of raw biodiversity: process biodiversity, structural 
biodiversity and anthropocentric biodiversity. Process biodiversity is based on 
properties that can be defined in terms of biological processes, structural biodiversity 
is based on Lewis’ notion of natural properties, whereas anthropocentric biodiversity is 
based on Quine’s notion of innately-acquired pretheoretical categories in which 
human beings perceive the world. 
In all three cases, Maclaurin’s approach to limiting properties is based on a considera-
tion of natural kinds. As he notes, classifying the world on the basis of natural kinds 
should generate “… some large set of well-motivated, non-gerrymandered properties 
that allow us to talk about similarity in general” (p. 201). Unfortunately, as Maclaurin 
notes, natural kinds alone do not generate a single well-defined measure of biodiver-
sity. One immediate problem is simply that we have no way of justifying the 
commensurability of different properties. Does ‘possessing an eye’ count as one 
property and ‘possessing red feathers’ count as another? Or is ‘having an eye’ actually 
a collection of properties such as ‘having a lens’, ‘having light sensitive cells’, ‘having 
an optic nerve’ and so on. In other words, at what level do we count properties? This 
is exactly the same problem that beset character richness measures, discussed above. 
Making an inventory of properties does not in itself give us a well-defined measure, 
although it may usefully illustrate where we should begin to look for one. 
Maclaurin raises some interesting critiques of each of the three ways of formulating 
raw biodiversity that he proposes. Consider, for example, raw process biodiversity. 
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Recall that this is defined in terms of natural kinds arising from some set of biologi-
cal processes. One such process is natural selection, so we can use process diversity 
as a means of comparing organisms on the basis of adaptations. As Maclaurin notes, 
however, limiting process diversity only to adaptations rules out properties that we 
might think are useful but which are mere ‘biological epiphenomena’, such as the 
ability of dung beetles to moderate blow-fly populations. Moreover, casting our net 
wider to include such epiphenomena by broadening the definition of process 
biodiversity appears only to return us to where we started, with nearly every conceiv-
able property counting as some sort of epiphenomenal property. 
A different set of objections can be raised against raw anthropocentric biodiversity, 
which is defined in terms of Quine’s concept of natural kinds as stemming from the 
way in which humans pretheoretically perceive and classify the world into classes of 
similar objects. This notion of biodiversity is explicitly anthropocentric, since it is 
based on our ‘innate’ propensity for classification. Maclaurin illustrates some of the 
problems stemming from this notion of raw anthropocentric biodiversity, such as its 
inability to reflect non-obvious features that do not form part of pan-cultural 
attributes of classificatory schemes. For example, many past (and some present) 
cultures classified whales as fish, largely because of their fish-like appearance. Of 
course, we now know that whales are mammals. Whales have not changed, but our 
fish-category has. Clearly, our classificatory schemes are not pretheoretically fixed. 
We can change them in the light of new knowledge. More fundamental objections 
may also be raised against Quine’s conception of natural kinds, both on philosophical 
grounds (Dupré, 1993, p. 277) and on biological grounds concerning the concept of 
innateness on which it is based (Lehrman, 1970; Lickliter & Berry, 1990; Bateson, 
1991; Maclaurin, 1998a). 
The third of Maclaurin’s three approaches to developing raw biodiversity is based on 
what he labels raw structural diversity. Of his three approaches, this is the one of 
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which Maclaurin is most dismissive. It is also the approach that comes closest to the 
notion of biodiversity developed in Chapters 4 and 5. Raw structural biodiversity is 
based on Lewis’ notion of natural properties. Of these Lewis says 
Sharing of them makes for similarity, they carve at the joints, they are in-
trinsic, they are highly specific, the sets of their instances are ipso facto not 
entirely miscellaneous, there are only just enough of them to characterise 
things completely and without redundancy. (Lewis, 1986, p. 60) 
As Maclaurin notes, the requirement of characterising without redundancy automati-
cally excludes disjunctive properties such as ‘being a mammal or a milk bottle’. A 
sensible scheme of classifying the world already includes mammals and milk bottles, 
and so a further classificatory rule based on ‘being a mammal or a milk bottle’ is 
redundant. Furthermore, raw structural biodiversity offers the possibility of including 
important epiphenomenal properties without also including ‘unnatural’ properties 
such as ‘being 4.2±1.7 light years from Proxima Centauri’. Hence it can overcome at 
least one of the major objections raised against raw process biodiversity. 
The main objections against raw structural biodiversity that Maclaurin raises concern 
the way it treats ecological categories such as ‘being a predator’. Lewis’ natural 
properties are intrinsic. According to Maclaurin, based on Lewis’ notion of what 
counts as an intrinsic property, ecological categories such as ‘being a predator’ do not 
qualify. Loosely speaking, Lewis defines a property of an object as intrinsic if it 
would still belong to that object unaccompanied—that is, if the object were in a lonely 
world (Lewis, 1986; Langton & Lewis, 1998). Since ‘being a predator’ is a property of 
an organism that depends on its relationship with other organisms, it is not an 
intrinsic property in Lewis’ strict sense and therefore can not be included among 
Lewis’ natural properties. 
One possible solution to this problem is to relax Lewis’ definition of intrinsic to 
include functional properties such as ‘being a predator’. There are two main theories 
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of biological function (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999). According to the etiological theory, 
biological functions are explained in terms of their evolutionary origins. Under the 
rival propensity theory, they are explained in terms of their present adaptive effects. So 
the etiological theory implies that a lion possesses the predator property because its 
ancestors were selected to kill and eat other animals, whereas the propensity theory 
implies it is because the lion is well-suited to killing and eating other animals. 
According to the propensity theory, a lion in a lonely world would no longer possess 
the predator property because there would be no other animals in that world for the 
lion to kill and eat. It would have no propensity for killing and eating other animals. 
According to the etiological theory, however, a lion can still possess the predator 
property in certain types of lonely worlds. These would be lonely worlds in which the 
lion has a history; in other words, worlds in which the lion persists through time. 
Admittedly, such worlds are not strictly lonely worlds, since the lion is accompanied 
by its past and future selves (Langton & Lewis, 1998). Nevertheless, although 
properties such as ‘being a predator’ are not strictly intrinsic according to Lewis’ 
definition, they are certainly not arbitrary. A suitably relaxed definition of intrinsic 
can accommodate functional properties without admitting such ontological detritus 
as ‘being 4.2±1.7 light years from Proxima Centauri’. 
Maclaurin raises a second objection against ecological categories such as ‘being a 
predator’. Because such categories are a matter of function rather than structure, they 
are multiply realisable. This means that the single category ‘being a predator’ might 
include a host of realisations that together represent a significant level of diversity 
not represented by the category alone. As Griffiths (1997) describes the problem, 
… the causal homeostatic mechanism of each ecological category is a 
particular set of adaptive forces [which] are sensitive only to properties at 
the level of task description, so properties at [lower] levels are not pro-
jectable in … categories derived from the ecological level … The same 
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task can be performed in many ways at lower levels of description. (p. 
234) 
Here Maclaurin raises a serious and interesting issue about biological classification. 
Ecological categories are generally more weakly projectable than, say, phylogenetic 
categories.26 However, they are projectable nonetheless. For example, if A and B are 
closely related species, and C and D are not closely related but share an ecological 
category such as ‘being a predator’, then we can generally be more confident about 
predicting the attributes of B from knowledge of the attributes of A than we can be 
about predicting the attributes of D from knowledge of the attributes of C. Never-
theless, despite the confidence level of predictions based on ecological categories 
being lower, they are not zero. 
Maclaurin’s objection can be further countered by considering ecological-historical 
categories. If A and B are closely related and share an ecological category such as 
being a predator, then the properties of A are more highly projectable onto B than if 
they shared only the phylogenetic or ecological category alone. Ecological categories 
may be multiply realisable, but history imposes constraints on the possible space of 
forms for realising any particular ecological function (Griffiths, 1997). Predators 
come in a wide range of forms, but the features of avian predators are quite consis-
tent despite their phylogenetic diversity—good eyesight, well-developed flying ability, 
sharp claws and hooked beaks.27 On their own, ecological properties may be only 
weakly projectable, but when combined with phylogenetic properties, they give rise 
to highly projectable categories. 
                              
26 For arguments in support of this assertion, see Griffiths & Sterelny (1999) Ch. 11 and de Queiroz & 
Good (1997). 
27 As a more detailed empirical example, Faith (1989) demonstrates the repeated evolution of certain 
morphological traits, in response to feeding mode, for many species of wading bird. 
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A final objection to raw structural biodiversity is simply that Lewis’ natural properties 
are not sufficiently abundant for characterising biological diversity. There are many 
more intrinsic properties than there are natural properties, given that natural 
properties occur only in fundamental physics (assuming everything else supervenes). 
Hence biologically similar things are unlikely to share many more natural properties 
than are biologically dissimilar things. Natural properties simply apply at the wrong 
level of detail to be useful in characterising biological diversity. 
Of the three forms of raw biodiversity discussed by Maclaurin, raw structural 
biodiversity has some potential for further development. Turning it into a workable 
concept would, however, require extending the range of properties used beyond 
Lewis’ natural properties to include other intrinsic properties, as well as relaxing the 
definition of what counts as an intrinsic property to include functionally-defined 
properties such as ‘being a predator’. The result, I suspect, would look much like the 
concept of biodiversity that I intend to develop in the following chapters. However, 
this is a point I do not wish to pursue in detail. My approach to developing an 
intrinsic concept of biodiversity will be quite different to that of Maclaurin. I plan to 
look first at a more general measurable property, and then show how biodiversity can 
be interpreted in terms of this property. Moreover, it is a universal, multilevel and, in 
Lewis’ strict sense, intrinsic property: complexity. 
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4 Complexity  
More is different. 
 — Phillip Anderson 
Complexity is a concept widely applied in discussions of biology, although not 
without controversy (Castrodeza, 1978; Hinegardner & Engleberg, 1983; McShea, 
1991, 1992, 1996a, 1996b; Yagil, 1985). Organisms and other biological systems are, it 
seems, complex entities. If only we could somehow quantify or otherwise understand 
biological complexity, we would perhaps better understand biology in general. The 
controversial aspects of complexity are manifold. First there is the issue of the 
origins of biological complexity. Why are living things complex compared to non-
living things? How do some organisms become more complex than others? A second 
controversy relates to the notion of ‘progress’ in evolution; whether or not it occurs, 
and the sense in which progress can be equated with increasing complexity. Although 
there is little doubt that many present-day species are much more complex than early 
prokaryotes, there is much doubt over assertions that there is some evolutionary 
drive towards increasing complexity or that this increasing complexity can be 
characterised in some meaningful sense as progressive (Gould, 1989, 1991, 1993; 
McShea, 1991; Ridley, 1993). 
A third controversy regarding biological complexity concerns mathematical and 
computational approaches to understanding complex systems. The so-called ‘sciences 
of complexity’ address problems in the biological sciences and other areas in which 
‘complex adaptive systems’ play a fundamental role, and try to render difficult 
problems in these areas tractable through the use of newly developed mathematical 
techniques and modern computer technology. Much of this work has attracted 
significant criticism, partly because of the imbalance between its excessive hyperbole 
and modest successes (Horgan, 1995). 
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None of these criticisms concerns my project. I make no claims for the origins of 
biological complexity, nor for how complexity might change over time. Furthermore, 
I do not advocate any particular approach to understanding complex systems. My 
concerns are simply with the nature of complexity, its measurement, and its relation-
ship to biodiversity. In this chapter, I hope to develop some tools for understanding 
complexity and to show that complexity is a well-defined and intrinsic property of 
any system. In the following chapter, I will reinterpret biodiversity in terms of 
complexity. In other words, in answer to the question What is biodiversity?, my answer 
is biological complexity. If complexity is an intrinsic property of any system, then 
biodiversity, construed as biological complexity, must also be an intrinsic property of 
any biological system. First, however, I want to discuss an intuitive concept of 
complexity. 
4.1 An intuitive complexity concept 
Virtually by definition, complex systems are difficult to describe. Indeed, the more 
complex something is, the more difficulty we have in describing it. That is, the 
description of a complex thing tends to be longer than the corresponding description 
of a simple thing. This observation provides an intuitive and surprisingly useful 
concept for thinking about complexity measures; namely, that the relative complexi-
ties of objects can be compared by comparing the lengths of some descriptions of 
those objects. So, for example, if we wish to compare the complexity of a Volks-
wagen Beetle with that of a Boeing 747 passenger jet, we could compare a service-
manual description of the Beetle with a service manual description of the 747. By 
doing this we could then determine that the 747 is considerably more complex than 
the Beetle. 
In carrying out such a comparison, it is obviously important that the descriptions be 
at the same level of detail to make valid conclusions about relative complexity. If we 
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compared a service-manual description of the Beetle with an encyclopaedia-entry 
description of the 747, the former would probably be longer. However, whereas the 
service-manual description of the Beetle would contain considerable detail about 
minor parts such as the bonnet release mechanism and the windscreen wipers, the 
encyclopaedia-entry description of the 747 might only contain details about the 
aircraft’s dimensions, top speed, seating capacity and so on. It will ignore details 
about its altimeter, yaw-angle control system and a host of other features relevant to 
a service technician. In this case the description of the VW Beetle is longer than that 
of the 747 only because it contains more detail, not because the Beetle is more 
complex. 
With two highly dissimilar objects, defining what we mean by at the same level of detail 
may prove problematic. Suppose we wish to compare the complexity of a VW Beetle 
with that of the Matisse painting Les Poissons rouges (1911). What level of description 
of this painting corresponds to the service-manual level description of a VW Beetle? 
We could try describing Les Poissons rouges using the steps a colour-by-numbers copy 
artist would use to reproduce the painting. Or we could describe it using the actual 
brushstrokes and colour choices Matisse made in creating the painting. We could 
even try scanning a photograph of the painting into a computer and applying the 
latest image compression software to give a description in terms of a computer file 
that we could send to a friend by e-mail. Clearly none of these is exactly analogous to 
the sort of engineering description used in a VW Beetle service manual. Indeed it 
appears that no such description exists, tempting us to conclude that the complexi-
ties of the two objects cannot be meaningfully compared in this way. Whereas 
comparing the complexities of similar types of objects, such as VW Beetles and 
Boeing 747s, is relatively straightforward, comparing the complexities of dissimilar 
objects appears problematic. Later on we shall see that this problem is not as 
intractable as it first appears. At this stage, it will suffice to observe that, provided the 
objects in question are not too dissimilar, then we can make meaningful comparisons 
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of their complexities by comparing similar level descriptions of the objects. More-
over, the more similar the two objects are, the more meaningful such a comparison 
becomes and the more meaningful is our measure of their relative complexities based 
on description length. 
A further observation about this sort of complexity measure is that it tends to 
become more accurate as we include more detail in our descriptions. Superficial 
descriptions of a VW Beetle and Boeing 747 listing their colours, shapes and overall 
appearances might lead us to conclude that their complexities are similar. Even a 
description listing their major components (engine, wheels, windscreen, exhaust 
system etc.) might be misguiding as a measure of complexity. Only when we come to 
describing each at a sufficient level of detail, such as the sort of descriptions required 
if we were to try to build each from scratch, do we begin to appreciate the significant 
differences in complexity between the two objects. 
One of the features of complex objects is that they can usually be described in a 
number of different ways. Take, for example, copies of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar 
and the Barbara Cartland romance novel Bride to a Brigand. Since both of these are to 
some extent the same sort of thing—stories written in ink on paper—we should be 
able to make comparisons about their relative complexities. Which is more complex? 
If we use a length-of-description technique to determine the answer, the outcome 
will depend on the type of description we adopt. We could describe each in terms of 
the physical location of every atom of which they consist, or in terms of the two-
dimensional patterns on their pages, or simply in terms of the texts themselves. In all 
three cases we might find that Bride to a Brigand is more complex, largely because it is 
longer and physically bulkier than our copy of Julius Caesar. What we might really be 
interested in, though, is the meaningful content of the stories. In this case we could try 
to describe each in terms of features such as the number of characters, details about 
each character, aspects of plot development, overall themes, interesting uses of 
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language and the other sorts of elements studied by students of English. Once we 
carry this out we will probably find that Julius Caesar is significantly more complex 
than Bride to a Brigand. Clearly this sort of description-length definition of complexity 
is not, on its own, well-defined unless we specify the sort of description to be 
applied. In other words, we cannot talk about the complexity of something unless we 
have some understanding of the sort of description-level attributes to which we wish 
our notion of complexity to refer. 
At this stage it seems like complexity is not a very intrinsic property. If, for every-
thing whose complexity we wish to measure, we first have to specify the type of 
description to be applied, then it looks as if we are not measuring any strongly 
intrinsic complexity-like property, only complexity with respect to some arbitrarily-
selected set of qualities. This, however, is not what I want. I want a strongly intrinsic 
concept of complexity that can be used as a strongly intrinsic concept of biodiversity. 
Later I hope to demonstrate how we can solve this problem. 
Leaving these metaphysical questions aside for the moment, let us think of complex-
ity in terms of a metric—a mathematical function that we can use to measure the 
amount of some property (complexity) possessed by any system. So if x is some 
system, let C(x) be the complexity of x and let C(x, y) be the complexity of the joint 
system consisting of x and y. Well-defined mathematical measures tend to have 
properties such as the following: 
1. C(x) ≥ 0 (non negativity) 
2. If x = y, C(x) = C(y) (reflexivity) 
3. C(x, y) = C(y, x) (symmetry) 
4. C(x, y) ≥ C(x) (accumulation) 
5. C(x) + C(y) ≥ C(x, y) (convexity). 
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How then does description length fare in terms of the above properties? It can be 
clearly demonstrated that, properly understood, a description length definition of 
complexity satisfies all of them. It satisfies the test for non-negativity, since it is 
impossible to write a description of negative length. It satisfies the test for reflexivity, 
since identical objects can be given identical descriptions, which therefore have 
identical lengths. It also satisfies symmetry, given that a description of the system 
consisting of x and y is the same as a description of the system consisting of y and x. 
It satisfies accumulation, since the description of the system consisting of x and y is 
at least as long as the description of x alone. Finally, it satisfies convexity, since the 
description of the system consisting of x and y is no longer than the description of x 
together with the description of y. 
This last point is interesting. The reason the description of the system consisting of x 
and y is generally shorter than the combined descriptions of each element considered 
separately is that x and y may share some similarities. In other words, a joint 
description of the two elements considered separately may contain some redundancy, 
which can be removed without loss of completeness to describe the system consist-
ing of both elements. Using the expression C(x : y) to specify the amount of 
redundancy in the system (x, y)—that is, the amount of complexity shared by x and 
y—we can measure redundancy by C(x : y) = C(x) + C(y) – C(x, y). If x and y are 
identical, then C(x : y) = C(x) = C(y), whereas if x and y share no similarities, 
C(x : y) = 0. 
For example, consider once again our VW Beetle. Our Beetle is not more complex 
by virtue of its having two rear brake drums instead of only one. Description length 
can quite easily account for redundancy. A service manual description of a VW 
Beetle, for example, would not include a separate entry for each rear brake drum. 
Instead there would be merely one entry that covers both. This entry might take the 
form of a detailed description of the right rear brake drum, together with a short 
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statement such as “the left rear brake drum is a mirror-reversed copy of the right rear 
brake drum.” This additional sentence can be made arbitrarily short, thereby 
representing virtually no additional complexity. This suggests that we should not use 
just any description to assess complexity, but the shortest or at least nearly shortest 
possible description, given the existing language constraints. In other words, we 
should remove all redundancy. So instead of including in our description of a VW 
Beetle, “has one wheel with attributes {a1, a2, …, an} and another wheel with 
attributes {a1, a2, …, an} and another wheel …”, we should simply say, “has four 
wheels with attributes {a1, a2, …, an}”. Whether there are four identical wheels or 
only one will therefore have little bearing on overall complexity. 
This issue of convexity, however, is not so straightforward. In some cases, descrip-
tion length does not appear to satisfy convexity. The description of a system 
consisting of several elements can be longer than the combined descriptions of those 
elements alone, because the elements can have relational properties. This is a feature 
of complex systems in general. They are typically more complex than the complexity 
of their parts would suggest. According to Anderson (1972), more is not just more; 
more is different. 
One of the ways around this problem is to consider relational properties when 
measuring complexity. So the system (x, y) consists only of the elements x and y 
without any relational properties, whereas the system consisting of x and y and 
including all their relational properties p1, p2, …, pn should be written as something 
like (x, y, p1, p2, p3, …, pn). For example, a working VW Beetle is in some sense more 
complex that a pile of junk consisting of the parts of a VW Beetle. The elements of a 
working VW Beetle comprise not just its parts but the relational properties between 
those parts. In contrast, the pile of Beetle parts contains no significant relational 
properties, only the single relational property ‘randomly assembled into a pile’. In 
terms of description length, the description of a working VW Beetle would have to 
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include more than simply a description of the parts that comprise that VW Beetle; it 
would also have to include a description of how those parts go together. A descrip-
tion of a disassembled Beetle is therefore shorter then a description of a working 
Beetle. By including all such relational properties, convexity is maintained. 
This intuitive notion of measuring the complexity of an object by the length of a 
description of that object seems to be very useful. It is perhaps unsurprising, 
therefore, that description length, loosely defined, forms the basis for all complexity 
measures. The differences between measures arise in large part from adopting 
different types of descriptions, or more specifically, different representations. We will 
now look in more detail at some of these specific complexity measures. From a 
mathematical perspective, the simplest types of complexity measures to consider are 
those that apply to strings of symbols. And strings of symbols are exactly the sort of 
objects dealt with by the mathematical theory of information.  
4.2 Information content as a measure of complexity 
Information theory officially began in 1948 with the work of Bell engineer Claude 
Shannon (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). Shannon was concerned with quantifying 
information for the purposes of better understanding how messages could be 
efficiently transmitted over noisy communication channels. The technical concept of 
information applied in information theory is quite different to the everyday concept 
of information as ‘meaningful message content’. In information theory, the meaning 
of any message is explicitly ignored. Instead, information is identified more with the 
length of the message or the ‘cost’ of transmitting it. Hence the amount of informa-
tion in a message depends not only on the message itself but on the communication 
system in which the message is transmitted. 
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A simple communication system considered by Shannon consists of an information 
source that transmits a message chosen from a finite set of characters in the form of a 
signal over a channel to a receiver. The channel can also introduce noise, which changes 
the signal at the receiver from that sent by the source. In the context of such an 
arrangement, Shannon defined information as a measure of the reduction in 
uncertainty at the receiver as a result of transmitting the message. 
Suppose the source can only transmit two types of characters, say ‘0’ and ‘1’, and 
from the perspective of the receiver, each of these has equal probability of being 
transmitted. Assuming no noise, transmission of a single character therefore reduces 
the uncertainty at the receiver by half. Before transmission there were two possibili-
ties—‘0’ or ‘1’—whereas after transmission there is only one possibility defined by 
whichever character was sent. If, instead of one character, we consider a message 
consisting of three characters, then the number of possible messages that can be sent 
is eight (000, 001, 010, 011, 100, 101, 110 and 111). Transmission of a particular 
message, say ‘110’, therefore reduces the uncertainty by a factor of eight. The 
information measure defined by Shannon takes the logarithm of the reduction in 
uncertainty as an estimate of the information content of the message. So in the above 
example, the quantity of information sent is logn8. Although the logarithmic base 
used is arbitrary, it is conventional to use base two, in which case the unit of 
information is the ‘bit’ (a contraction of binary digit). Hence the above message ‘110’ 
consists of three bits of information. Indeed for any string of equiprobable binary 
digits, Shannon’s information measure corresponds exactly with the length of the 
string transmitted. 
One of the nice aspects of considering information in terms of reduction in uncer-
tainty is that is can account for redundancy. If I send you the e-mail message “I 
WILL SEE YOU INSIDE THE ROYAL RANDWICK HOTEL THIS EVENING 
AT 7 O’CLOCK”, I have transmitted just as much information as if I had sent the 
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much more compact “C U IN ROYAL 7 2NITE”. This is because both messages 
reduce your uncertainty about where and when I intend next to see you by the same 
amount. There are, however, some penalties associated with the second message 
form. One is that you have to do more work to understand the second message. For 
example, you have to know that ‘C’ and ‘U’ can be translated into the common 
English words ‘see’ and ‘you’, respectively, and you have to extract from the context 
of the message that this is how I intend you to understand them. A second penalty is 
that the second message is much more prone to being misunderstood, especially if 
noise happens to be introduced into our communication system. Suppose the e-mail 
system has the annoying habit of occasionally replacing individual characters by ‘N’ 
in all its messages. The first message might then be received by you as “I WILL SEE 
YOU INNIDE THE ROYAL RANDWINK HOTEL THIN EVENING AT 7 
O’CLONK”. As a result you might exchange a few witty remarks on my poor 
spelling and/or typing skills upon meeting me at the intended time and place. If, 
however, I chose the more economic message format, you might receive a message 
such as “C U IN ROYAL 7 2NINE”, in which case I might end up waiting around 
for almost two hours while you drink with other friends at the Doncaster and discuss 
my odd habit of setting overly precise meeting times. 
As the above example shows, redundancy in communication systems is not always a 
bad thing. It can reduce the amount of work required by the receiver to decode the 
message and provide a way of making the message robust to noise. Indeed ‘error 
correcting codes’ are used extensively in communication systems expressly for this 
purpose. In many cases, however, redundancy in a message can cost time and money. 
If I want to e-mail you a large text file, using a file compression program such as 
WinZip can reduce the size of the file by removing some of its redundancy, thereby 
reducing the amount of time and money it costs me to send it to you. Provided you 
also have a copy of WinZip on your computer, you should be able to decompress the 
file and read it. The key aspect of this strategy is it requires that we both have a copy 
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of WinZip. That is, not only must the source be able to encode the message, but the 
receiver must know how to decode it. Redundancy is therefore not a property of the 
message itself but an aspect of the entire communication system. There is a joke 
about a country pub in which the patrons have heard every joke so often that instead 
of bothering to tell an entire joke, they just refer to it by a number (upon which the 
other patrons laugh).28 In other words, how redundant a message is depends not just 
on the message but on how much the receiver already knows. 
A system’s ‘information content’ can be used as a measure of its complexity. If the 
system is itself a message string, then assuming equiprobable digits and ignoring 
redundancy for the moment, we need only consider the length of the string. The 
string ‘1011’ contains four bits of information, whereas the string ‘01101010’ 
contains eight bits. The second string is in some sense twice as complex as the first 
because it is twice as hard for us to specify. Considerations of redundancy may lead 
us to reduce the complexity of some highly ordered strings. So, for example, the 
string ‘11111111’ consists of eight bits, but it is in some sense less complex than the 
eight-bit string ‘01101010’, because is can be replaced by the simple instruction 
“write ‘1’ eight times”. To account for this sort of redundancy, we need a different 
complexity measure, one based not simply on information content but on some 
notion of ‘true information content’; that is, on information content with all 
redundancy removed. However, we have just seen that redundancy is context 
dependent, so how should we remove all redundancy in a consistent and well-
principled manner? 
                              
28 In one version of this joke, a visitor to the pub calls out ‘63’ and nobody laughs because he didn’t 
tell it right. In another version, everybody laughs hysterically because it was one they hadn’t heard 
before. 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 76 
Algorithmic information content (AIC) was introduced in the 1960s as a means of 
measuring the ‘true information content’ of a message string. It is a measure that can 
account for all redundancy in a message string without making any assumptions 
about the knowledge of a receiver. Consider a so-called universal computer—an 
idealised all-purpose computer with infinite storage capacity. Consider also a message 
consisting of a string of symbols taken from a finite alphabet. The AIC of the string 
is then defined as the shortest program that can be run on the computer which will 
cause the computer to print out that string and then stop. 
This definition of AIC is quite useful for measuring the complexity of certain 
computational problems. This type of complexity measure is known as Kolmogorov 
complexity, after the Russian mathematician instrumental in its invention. The 
advantage of Kolmogorov complexity is that it effectively addresses the issue of 
redundancy. Instead of a program that says “print ‘1’ then print ‘1’ then … then print 
‘1’ then stop”, we could write a program that says “print ‘1’ eight times then stop”. 
The Kolmogorov complexity of a string of eight 1s is something like the length of 
the second program rather than the former. More typically, this complexity measure 
is not used as an absolute measure applied to individual strings, but as a way of 
understanding how the complexity of a class of computational problems increases as 
the size of the problem increases. For example, if we make the string of 1s longer 
and longer, its Kolmogorov complexity remains almost constant. Thus, regardless of 
its length, a highly ordered string can be described by a short program and has little 
Kolmogorov complexity, whereas the Kolmogorov complexity of a random string 
increases in proportion to the length of the string. 
The definition of Kolmogorov complexity in terms of the length of a computer 
program seems to raise a problem of language dependence. A program written in one  
programming language will typically differ in length from a program written in 
another language. Indeed, the same criticism seems to apply to any sort of descrip-
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 77 
tion-length definition of complexity. How can we be sure that, in trying to compare 
the complexities of different systems, the outcome does not depend on the choice of 
language? 
The solution to this problem involves modifying the programming language in each 
case so as to minimise the expected value of the code word lengths. It has been 
proved that for any universal computer, there exists a slightly modified universal 
computer such that the average algorithmic information content over a class of 
systems is essentially equal to the Shannon information content over that class of 
systems (Gell-Mann & Lloyd, 1996). Once we have specified the class of systems we 
are dealing with, the residual algorithmic information content of a particular member 
of that class is then given by the length of the code assigned to it by the modified 
universal computer. In short, there is a technique for removing language-dependence 
from the overall measure, thereby reducing the Kolmogorov complexity of any 
system to a universal metric. Just as we can measure the information content of a 
message with a universal metric, so too can we measure its Kolmogorov complexity. 
In both cases the same unit applies, namely the bit. 
To illustrate how Kolmogorov complexity can be applied to physical systems, 
consider a box containing helium atoms. A simplified example of this is illustrated in 
Figure 7a below. One way of measuring the complexity of this system is to measure 
the amount of information I would be required to send to you in order for you to 
reproduce this system almost exactly. I would therefore have to specify the location 
of every atom in the box to some specified degree of accuracy and using some agreed 
coordinate system, and then transmit this information to you. If the atoms were in a 
gaseous state and randomly distributed within the box, then my message would look 
like a string of mostly random numbers. Now consider a second box in which every 
helium atom is crammed into one corner, as shown in Figure 7b. I could again 
specify the location of each atom using the same technique as before, but my 
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message would contain a high degree of redundancy. This is because I can use the 
fact that all the atoms are crammed into one corner of the box to reduce the length 
of the message I need to send to you. For example, if the corner into which all the 
atoms were crammed corresponded to the origin of my coordinate system, then I 
could simply reduce the number of digits required to specify the location of each 
atom. In a sense I have specified a much shorter algorithm for you to use in 
reconstructing the box of atoms. 
 
 a b 
Figure 7: Examples of highly disordered (a) and ordered (b) systems. 
The measure of complexity used in the above example is akin to a measure of the 
entropy of the physical system. This is far from coincidental, since there are deep 
links between information theory and the thermodynamic concept of entropy. 
Indeed the logarithmic equation for measuring information proposed by Shannon is 
analogous to an equation used to measure the entropy of a physical system. What this 
implies is that highly entropic systems—those with a lot of entropy—also have, in 
the sense discussed above, a lot of information content and hence a lot of complex-
ity. So if we took a cockroach and heated it up in the absence of oxygen, thereby 
turning it into a gas, the gaseous cockroach would have much more entropy and 
therefore much more Kolmogorov complexity than the living cockroach. 
There is an obvious problem here. This is that complexity as normally understood 
does not usually apply to systems with a highly random arrangement of elements. 
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The gaseous cockroach in the above example is more entropic than our living 
cockroach, but it is in some sense much less complex. There is something important 
about the way the components of a living cockroach are arranged that is lost when 
we turn the cockroach into a gas. A cockroach has lots of internal relational proper-
ties between its elements. When we turn the cockroach into a gas, we lose these 
relational properties. Indeed neither highly ordered systems such as crystals nor 
highly disordered systems such as gases are complex in the sense that a cockroach is 
complex. The sort of measure we require to differentiate between simple and 
complex systems is not the same as the measures we can use to differentiate between 
ordered and disordered systems. Unfortunately, the more random a string, the higher 
is its Kolmogorov complexity; which is almost the opposite of what we want. 
There is a second, less obvious problem with Kolmogorov complexity as a practical 
complexity measure. Consider the following example. There is a relatively short 
program that will print out digits 1,000,001 to 2,000,000 of the decimal expression of 
the number π. The Kolmogorov complexity of these one million digits is therefore 
quite low. However, if I simply gave you these digits and asked you to find the 
shortest algorithm that would print them out, you would have little idea of where to 
start looking. The digits themselves appear truly random. They will pass any statistical 
test for randomness you might subject them to in order to discern a pattern. You 
might therefore conclude that the only suitable algorithm is “print …” followed by 
the string itself; in other words that the Kolmogorov complexity for this string is 
maximal. This problem is an illustration of a curious property of Kolmogorov 
complexity: its uncomputability (Gell-Mann, 1994). What this means is that, for a 
given string, there is no algorithm that will produce the shortest possible program 
that will output that string and hence return a value for its Kolmogorov complexity. 
In other words, even if we devise a program that efficiently prints out a string by 
accounting for some of the string’s redundancy, we can never be sure that this is the 
most efficient program that exists. 
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There are other types of complexity measure that overcome the uncomputability 
problem by placing limits on the set of algorithms from which the minimum length 
algorithm is to be selected. Despite this advance, both Kolmogorov and these other 
types of complexity measure are ‘entropic measures’; that is, they are maximal for 
truly random strings. Although they are useful for assessing the difficulty of certain 
computational problems, they fail to capture the sense of complexity we want to use 
as a measure of biodiversity. What we need is a different sort of complexity measure; 
one based on a different sort of system representation. 
4.3 Alternative complexity measures 
To overcome the above limitation of informational measures of complexity, several 
alternative measures of complexity have been proposed for use in a range of 
disciplines (Cornacchio, 1977; Grassberger, 1988; Löfgren, 1977; Papentin, 1980). 
The key feature of these alternative complexity measures is that the random parts of 
the system in question—that is, those highly entropic parts that do not contribute to 
what we consider to be the system’s overall complexity—are dealt with in such a way 
that they contribute little to the final complexity measure. As mentioned previously, 
all complexity measures, even those based on measuring information content, require 
us to measure the length or some other size aspect of a representation of the system 
in question. For a purely informational measure of a string of symbols, the represen-
tation is the string itself. For Kolmogorov complexity, the representation is the 
shortest computer program that will output the string. Neither of these representa-
tions proved appropriate. However, if we adopt a different representation, we can 
devise a complexity measure that captures the sense of complexity in which we are 
interested. 
Consider the previous example of a box filled with helium. In this example I was 
trying to devise a message that I could send to you in order for you to recreate the 
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system. Since I wanted you to recreate the system almost exactly, I went about 
measuring the position of each helium atom and putting this information into my 
message. Suppose instead that I was not interested in the exact position of each 
helium atom. Suppose that all I wanted you to reproduce was a box filled with 
helium. In this case the message I would have to send to you in order for you to 
reproduce such a box would be very small. All I would have to say is “build a box of 
dimensions x × y × z and fill it with h amount of helium”. I could then be pretty sure 
that you would produce a box of helium atoms very much like mine. It would not be 
exactly the same, since the positions of the atoms in my box would be quite different 
to those of the atoms in your box. Nevertheless, the representations of each box as “a 
box of dimensions x × y × z filled with h amount of helium” would be the same. 
Moreover, this representation is now much smaller than the previous representation 
that specified the position of every atom. Hence the complexity of such a system 
measured as the length of this representation is also quite small. 
Consider an example of a complexity measure based on the length of a simplified 
representation. The type of complexity is known as ‘regular language complexity’ 
(RLC), and is applied to character strings. The measure is applied not to particular 
strings but to the class of strings to which a particular string might belong. Any string 
can be classified in terms of the rules governing its generation. That is, the string may 
be constrained by certain ‘grammatical’ features. For example, in a portion of English 
text, the character following the character ‘Q’ is almost always ‘U’, whereas the 
character ‘V’ is commonly followed by ‘E’ or ‘O’ but almost never by ‘N’. Similarly, 
the phrase ‘Once upon a’ is commonly followed by the word ‘time’. These ‘gram-
matical’ rules can be represented using a ‘deterministic graph’. To illustrate the idea 
of a deterministic graph, consider the example of a string of 0s and 1s whose only 
grammatical rule is “the sequence ‘11’ is always followed by ‘0’”. In other words, the 
string will never contain three or more 1s in a row. An example string of this class is 
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‘1011001101011000’. The deterministic graph for all strings of this class is illustrated 
in Figure 8a below. 
1
0
1
0
0
0 1
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Figure 8: Deterministic graphs for sequences of binary digits (a) with the 
grammatical rule “‘11’ is always followed by ‘0’” and (b) with no grammatical 
rules. 
To understand how a deterministic graph encodes a grammatical rule, try writing out 
a sequence of 1s and 0s using the graph as a guide. Using any node as a starting 
point, select one of the paths leading from the node at random to generate the first 
digit, using the path label indicated. Following this path takes you to another node 
(or in some cases the same node). The second digit is generated by taking one of the 
available paths from this second node to a third node and so on. Applying this 
process using the graph of Figure 8b will generate a sequence of digits in which the 
grammatical rule is obeyed; that is, in which ‘11’ is always followed by ‘0’. The class 
of sequences in which no grammatical rules apply; that is, in which the selection of 
digits is random and completely unconstrained, can be represented by the graph of 
Figure 8b. 
The regular language complexity of a class of sequences is measured by the number 
of nodes in its deterministic graph. As the above graphs show, under this measure, 
strings of binary digits constrained only by the rule “‘11’ is always followed by ‘0’” 
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are three times as complex as purely random strings. Strings of binary digits repre-
senting ASCII29 coded English sentences would be constrained by a large set of rules 
pertaining to permissible letter combinations, words, word combinations, English 
grammar and so on. Such strings would thus require a very large graph for their full 
representation and would have a correspondingly large measure of RLC. 
Although RLC only captures the complexity of the string’s ‘grammar’, not of its 
meaningful content, it provides a practical example of how the right sort of represen-
tation can adequately account for the entropy problem that afflicted complexity 
measures such as Kolmogorov complexity. This sort of simplified representation is 
exactly what was being used in the previous example comparing the complexity of a 
VW Beetle with that of a Boeing 747 aircraft. If I wanted you to recreate a VW 
Beetle I could, as in the box of helium example given previously, measure the 
position of every atom in the Beetle and transmit this information to you. However, 
the vast majority of this information is not required to produce a working VW 
Beetle. The exact position of every iron atom in the steering column is not particu-
larly useful information. From the perspective of how difficult it is to reproduce a 
working VW Beetle, this information is simply not relevant, because many combina-
tions of atoms are adequate. What would be more useful and efficient is to specify 
the dimensions of each part, its materials, how all the parts fit together and so on. 
This brings me back to the sort of service-manual description considered previously. 
Suppose now that instead of a VW Beetle I wanted you to recreate a cockroach. 
Again I would not need to transmit the position of every atom in the cockroach, 
since the exact position of every atom is in many cases not relevant to producing a 
working cockroach. Nevertheless, the amount of information that would have to be 
                              
29 American Standard Code for Information Interchange. 
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transmitted in order for you to reproduce a working cockroach would be very large. 
Even if I disassembled the cockroach and accurately measured every part I could 
find and transmitted this vast amount of information to you, it is doubtful in the 
extreme that you could successfully reproduce a working cockroach. You might 
successfully produce an inanimate replica of a cockroach, but to reproduce a working 
cockroach from scratch would require at least a vast extension to existing scientific 
knowledge about basic insect physiology. Even supposing that such knowledge were 
available and reproduction from scratch of a working cockroach were feasible, the 
amount of information that I would need to send to you to effect this task, com-
pared to that for a VW Beetle, would be truly mind boggling. This is the sense in 
which biological organisms are complex. The complexity of a VW Beetle is impres-
sive compared to that of a bicycle, and that of a Boeing 747 is more impressive still, 
but all of them are dwarfed by the complexity of a single cockroach. 
4.4 The metaphysics of complexity 
Is complexity an intrinsic property? Is it, like mass, a property that something 
possesses even in lonely worlds? Is it, like beauty, in the eye of the beholder? Or is it 
something in between? As we have seen, to measure the complexity of a system, we 
first have to generate a representation of the system, and then measure the size of 
that representation. Complexity is therefore representation-dependent; the sort of 
measure we end up with depends on the sort of representation we choose. Unless I 
can specify some way of ‘privileging’ one type of representation over all others, we 
are free to choose whatever representation we want. What we are left with is not 
complexity as a strongly intrinsic property, but some arbitrarily-defined version of 
complexity. How much complexity something has would not only depend on the 
thing itself but on the way we choose to look at it. To an entomologist, a cockroach 
might be complex, but to an echidna it is just one more type of food. 
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Many authors accept the thesis that complexity is not a strongly intrinsic property, or 
at least that there are many different types of complexity, none of which can be 
singled out in some principled manner. Löfgren sums up this position in terms of the 
representation-dependency of complexity. 
… complexity [should] be associated with descriptions, rather than being 
thought of as an intrinsic property of objects. (Löfgren, 1977, p. 197) 
Kurths and Witt also emphasise the contextual nature of complexity … 
It is important to recognise that complexity measures are contextual, i.e. 
they cannot be defined universally but depend on some context. (Kurths 
& Witt, 1994, p. 191) 
… while Cornacchio emphasises its observer-dependence. 
the complexity of a system is relative to an observer’s knowledge of the 
system … to the neurophysiologist the brain … is certainly complex … 
while to a butcher, a sheep brain is simple, since he has to distinguish it 
from only, say, 30 other meats. (Cornacchio, 1977, p. 221) 
McIntyre bluntly denies complexity any intrinsic status. 
… complexity is derivative rather than inherent. Complexity exists not 
merely as a feature of the world, but as a feature of our attempts to un-
derstand the world. Complexity, in short, is inextricably bound up with 
your point of view. (McIntyre, 1998, p. 28) 
Should we accept this position, or is there some way of formulating complexity that 
makes it a strongly intrinsic property of some systems? My aim is to show the latter. 
Although complexity is representation-dependent, such that different representations 
result in different complexity measures, some of these representations may be ‘better’ 
than others when judged according to some sensible criteria. If we can pick out a 
single measure from the alternatives using these criteria, the choice of representation 
is no longer arbitrary, and we can perhaps establish that the resulting measure is 
based on some strongly intrinsic property. To demonstrate that complexity is a 
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strongly intrinsic property, therefore, I need to specify some sensible criteria for 
picking out a single privileged representation and ruling out the alternatives. 
4.5 Effective complexity 
The sort of intrinsic complexity measure I have in mind is one based on a description 
of a system that captures all its perceivable regularities. The property defined by such 
a measure is intrinsic because there is no room for making subjective decisions about 
what counts as a regularity and what does not—all regularities are counted. To 
illustrate what I mean by ‘all perceivable regularities’, consider the previous example 
of generating strings of symbols based on pre-defined grammatical rules. For these 
systems, we can exhaustively list every rule governing their regularities, if only 
because we specified such rules prior to creating the system.30 There is no room for 
arbitrary decisions about what does and does not count as a regularity in such 
systems, because the systems have been created with all their regularities already 
specified. 
To define a measure of complexity based on ‘all perceivable regularities’ for less 
contrived examples, we need to specify a well-defined procedure for determining 
what does and does not count as a regularity of any given system. Gell-Mann and 
Lloyd (1996) propose such a procedure. What this procedure gives us is a way of 
privileging some representations over others in terms of how much of the regularities 
of the system each describes. Complexity is then measured by the length of the 
representation that most concisely describes the maximal set of regularities. This they 
call ‘effective complexity’. 
                              
30 Even though a particular string might happen, out of pure chance, to posses a small number of 
regularities that cannot be accounted for by the rules governing its generation, such regularities play a 
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The idea that some representations are better than others can be made precise 
through the definition of ‘total information content’. This is the sum of the Kolmo-
gorov complexity of the representation we are using to approximately describe the 
system, and the information left over that is required to fully specify the system 
(much of which is residual entropic or Shannon information). The best representa-
tion is the one that minimises the information content of the representation with the 
constraint that it also minimises total information content. In other words, the best 
representation uses all law-like regularities of the system to be both maximally 
descriptive and maximally concise. It contains no redundancy and is otherwise no 
longer than it needs to be (otherwise the complexity measure would not be minimal), 
but neither is it overly simple in the sense that it fails to describe certain regularities 
of the system (otherwise the total information content would not be minimal). 
Expressed another way, the complexity of a system can be thought of as the amount 
of compressible information possessed by the system, once that information has 
been maximally compressed using a Kolmogorov-type procedure. 
For complexity measures of physical systems, the constraint on minimising total 
information content automatically rules out spurious representations, such as 
specifying the system by the distance of every component from Proxima Centauri. 
This automatically overcomes the problem encountered in the previous chapter 
when discussing raw biodiversity, namely how to decide what properties to use in 
determining differences among groups of entities. The constraint on minimising total 
information content means that a representation based on a set of scientific theories 
that concisely represent certain regularities in the system is better than an atheoretical 
representation or one based on only a crude understanding of the system. Indeed the 
more we know about the system in terms of being able to concisely express some of 
                                                                                                                                     
small part in any complexity measure and become vanishingly small as we extend the measure to 
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its attributes, the closer is our complexity measure to an idealised effective complex-
ity measure derived from a representation based on everything there is to know 
about the system. 
The effective complexity of any object is an intrinsic property of that object in Lewis’ 
strict sense. It does not matter what we think of that object, nor what its relation-
ships are with any other objects; its effective complexity is an intrinsic property that 
can be objectively measured. Our complete and maximally concise representation of 
the object, and hence our measure of its effective complexity, would be the same 
length regardless of whether or not the object existed in a lonely world. Any 
representation that is not the same length is either not complete or not maximally 
concise. Of course, we might not exist in such lonely worlds to construct a represen-
tation and so measure the object’s effective complexity, just as we might not exist to 
measure its mass, but the property itself would still exist. 
Such an abstract idea as a complete and maximally concise representation can be 
better understood with an example. Let us call C our complexity measure, which is 
simply the information content of our representation, and S the residual information 
required to fully specify those aspects of the system not already expressed in C. The 
total information content, say T, is defined simply as T = C + S. Now take our VW 
Beetle. A measure for C based on a representation in which the position of every 
atom in the Beetle is specified would leave nothing left to specify, so then we would 
have S = 0 and T = C. This representation includes no theories about any regularities 
in the positions of the atoms of the VW Beetle. Hence C is very large, and so is T. 
Now we ask ourselves, can we specify a representation that reduces C and/or T? 
Clearly we can. We know that the steering column, for example, is made from steel 
                                                                                                                                     
strings of infinite length. 
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and has a specified set of dimensions. We can therefore predict the approximate 
location of a large number of iron and carbon atoms, and therefore reduce the 
amount of information required to exactly specify their locations. Using this 
knowledge allows us to produce a new representation that reduces C. We still have 
S = 0 and T = C, so we have simultaneously reduced C and T. 
If we keep modifying our representation by including everything we know about VW 
Beetles, we will continue to decrease C while simultaneously decreasing T. All the 
time, S = 0. Eventually, we will reach the limit of our knowledge and be unable to 
further reduce C while keeping S = 0. Now we ask ourselves, can we further reduce 
C without making T any bigger? Clearly we can. We have no theory that allows us to 
concisely express the exact location of every air molecule in the left front tyre, 
because these molecules are distributed randomly, at least within a bounding toroidal 
envelope. Their locations are still specified in C, but only because we had to measure 
them. In other words, most of the information required to specify the location of 
every molecule in the left front tyre is incompressible. If we now take this informa-
tion out of C and put it in S, we can further reduce C without increasing the size of 
T. Hence we again have a better representation. We could not do this for aspects of 
the VW Beetle that have a high degree of regularity because doing so would decrease 
C while keeping T constant, whereas if we know about the regularities, we can 
actually do better than this and decrease C while also decreasing T. If we keep 
moving all the incompressible information from C to S, we eventually come up with 
a minimised value for C, with the constraint that T is also minimised. Moreover, the 
more knowledge we include about VW Beetles in our representation, the closer is 
our complexity measure to this ideal measure based on a representation that includes 
all the predictive theoretical knowledge about the structure of VW Beetles that could 
ever exist. 
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How would such a complexity measure apply to organisms? Obviously, we could 
carry out the same sort of analysis for a cockroach, but in that case we are not even 
close to possessing a full theoretical understanding of cockroaches. Nevertheless, it 
seems more than plausible that such a full theoretical understanding is possible, at 
least in principle. If this is indeed the case, the notion of an intrinsic complexity 
measure of cockroaches is well-defined, even though our existing complexity 
measures are at best only poor approximations of this intrinsic complexity. And 
despite the fact that we can measure such complexity only very approximately, we 
can nevertheless chose between competing complexity measures on the basis of how 
much theoretical knowledge they embody. Even on the basis of such crude meas-
ures, we can easily recognise that a cockroach really is much more complex than an 
equivalent mass of gas or crystalline solid. The amount of possible theoretical 
knowledge about either gases or crystals is relatively small. Gases have a lot of 
entropy and therefore a lot of total information content, but they have little complex-
ity because there is virtually no theoretical knowledge that can be used to specify the 
state of their constituents more concisely than a complete description. Crystals, on 
the other hand, are easily described, so both their total information content and 
complexity are low. In contrast, there is an enormous amount that can be said about 
a cockroach that enables us to compress much of its information content. A 
cockroach may possess less entropy than a gas, but it possesses vastly more complex-
ity. 
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5 Biocomplexity  
It is interesting to contemplate an entangled bank, clothed with many plants of many 
kinds, with birds singing on the bushes, with various insects flitting about, and with 
worms crawling through the damp earth, and to reflect that these elaborately con-
structed forms, so different from each other, and dependent on each other in so complex 
a manner, have all been produced by laws acting around us. 
 — Charles Darwin 
5.1 Complexity as a measure of biodiversity 
At the core of my project is a simple proposal: that biodiversity be equated with 
complexity—in particular effective complexity. I have called this type of biodiversity 
biocomplexity. Biocomplexity is simply the effective complexity of any biological 
system. In this and the following chapter, I hope to flesh out this concept of 
biocomplexity and illustrate how it can be used to resolve some of the problems that 
beset biodiversity. Principally, biocomplexity is real. The biocomplexity of any living 
system is a strongly intrinsic property of that system. It does not depend on what we 
think of it. 
To justify the proposal that biodiversity be reformulated in terms of biocomplexity, I 
need to do more than simply list its advantages. I need at least to show that biocom-
plexity somehow corresponds to what we want biodiversity to mean. First, consider 
the similarities between the two concepts. Both diversity and complexity capture 
notions of heterogeneity; the unlikeness or richness of constituent parts. The inability 
to adequately account for heterogeneity is central to the criticisms already raised 
against species richness as a concept of biodiversity. Dissimilar species should 
constitute more diversity than similar species. Likewise, the notion of redundancy 
embodied by the concept of effective complexity accounts for the degree of 
heterogeneity within a system by excluding multiple descriptions of any similarities. 
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Of course, when biologists (among others) use the terms ‘diversity’ and ‘complexity’, 
they rarely describe exactly the same thing. Lawton (1997), for example, uses 
‘ecological complexity’ to denote something like the extent and integrity of ecological 
functions, and ‘biodiversity’ to denote species richness. These are two quite distinct 
concepts. Nevertheless, something like effective complexity is the kind of property 
that many biologists and conservationists seem to be referring to when they attempt 
to define biodiversity. A few examples from both scientific and popular publications 
can be found where the link between the two is explicit, such as: 
Biodiversity has been seen as the total (and irreducible) complexity of all 
life, including not only the great variety of organisms but also their un-
derlying behaviours and interactions. (NHM, 1994) 
Similarly, Levin (1996) relates the appropriate target property for a biodiversity 
measure to the ‘functional complexity’ of ecosystems. 
In the measurement of biodiversity, one must recognise the diversity 
within species as well as the diversity in terms of number of species, or 
do away with the notion of species entirely in favor of ‘continuum’ 
measures of the genetic and functional diversity of communities. Such 
continuum measures are more robust and probably more nearly repre-
sent the functional complexity of the system and its ability to respond to 
perturbations. (p. 279) 
Hence, at least in some cases, the concepts of biodiversity and complexity are not 
particularly distinct. 
A survey by Takacs (1996, p. 46–52) of eminent biologists’ opinions on what 
‘biodiversity’ means to them is revealing. Many of the given definitions of biodiver-
sity are vague, covering “the living resources of the planet” (Ehrlich), “the diversity 
of living things on the face of the earth” (Iltis), “the diversity of life in all its manifes-
tations” (Erwin) and “the richness of life” (Noss). More explicit definitions, however, 
sound a lot like effective complexity. Lovejoy describes biodiversity as “diversity at 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 93 
all levels of organization,” while for Falk it is “the dimension of difference at 
multiple levels of organization.” 
The most explicit definitions of biodiversity focus on these multiple levels of 
biological organisation, with particular emphasis on the three levels already men-
tioned: genes, species and ecosystems. Wilson (1996), for example, offers  
Biodiversity is defined as all hereditarily based variation at all levels of 
organization, from the genes within a single local population or species, 
to the species composing all or part of a local community, and finally to 
the communities themselves that compose the living parts of the multi-
farious ecosystems of the world. (p. 1) 
whereas May (1994) asserts that 
Biological diversity exists at many different levels, from the genetic di-
versity within local populations of a species, or between geographically 
distinct populations of the same species, all the way up to communities 
or ecosystems. (p. 13) 
Several consistent themes emerge from these attempted definitions. Biodiversity, it 
seems, 
1. includes notions of organisation and interaction as well as heterogeneity, 
2. covers many (perhaps all possible) levels of biological organisation, and 
3. is an intrinsic property. 
Whereas the first and second points are made explicit in many of the above quota-
tions, the third is implied by phrases such as May’s “exists at many different levels.” 
Not only is biodiversity something that exists independent of what we think of it, it 
manifests itself at multiple levels, some of which we have yet to discover. Biodiver-
sity therefore has, in the words of Michael Polanyi, “the capacity … to reveal itself in 
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unexpected ways in the future.” Biodiversity is, in short, an intrinsic property of the 
world. 
Biocomplexity, as I have shown, has all of the above three attributes we want from a 
concept of biodiversity. Recall that the biocomplexity of a biological system is 
measured by the length of a complete and maximally concise description of the 
regularities of that system. As such, a measure of biocomplexity must include all 
possible heterogeneity, organisation and interaction within the system. Otherwise the 
description on which it is based would be either incomplete or not maximally 
concise. Moreover, biocomplexity is an intrinsic property of any system, since it is 
based on a single, well-defined31 and privileged system representation. Hence 
biocomplexity seems like the right sort of concept for understanding biodiversity. In 
the following section, I hope to show why any reasonable biodiversity measure based 
on a more weakly defined target property could not be strongly intrinsic. 
5.2 The uniqueness of biocomplexity 
I have adopted the term biocomplexity for several reasons. One is to provide a concise 
means of referring to the concept of biodiversity based on effective complexity. 
Another is simply to delineate the concept from the glut of alternative biodiversity 
concepts already discussed. There is, however, a third and stronger reason. This is 
that biodiversity, as I see it, is a misnomer. Biodiversity is not about diversity but about 
complexity. The concepts of diversity and complexity, although similar in many respects, 
are not exactly the same. In particular, biodiversity is an intrinsic property of any 
biological system (or at least that is the sort of property we want it to be), and yet, as 
                              
31 Well-defined in the sense that there exists a well-defined procedure for generating the appropriate 
system representation, even though full execution of this procedure may be hopelessly impractical. 
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I hope to show, no concept of diversity weaker than effective complexity itself could 
possibly be intrinsic. 
Despite asserting that biodiversity is a misnomer, I am not advocating that it be 
expunged from the popular lexicon and replaced by biocomplexity. Biodiversity is too 
deeply embedded for that, whereas biocomplexity has already been coopted for use in 
the application of complex systems theory to biological systems.32 Biodiversity is a 
useful and acceptable term. As a concept for use in conservation efforts, however, 
we should recognise that what we mean by biodiversity, if we are talking about some 
intrinsic feature of the world, is necessarily biocomplexity. 
Recall the objection raised in Section 3.3, when discussing raw biodiversity, against a 
theory-free measure of diversity. Without any theory to discount ‘unnatural’ proper-
ties such as ‘being 4.2±1.7 light years from Proxima Centauri’ or ‘being neither an 
aardvark nor an aeroplane’, any two objects are both similar and dissimilar in 
infinitely many ways. Hence a theory-free measure of diversity is impossible. To 
construct a sensible diversity measure, we need to limit what counts as a property by 
considering only those properties that stem from theoretical knowledge about the 
objects in question. We were still left with a problem, however; that of deciding 
which theories to use. How do we decide which theories are unnatural and which are 
not? How can we decide between ‘appropriate’ theories like evolutionary biology, 
under which we might derive a property such as ‘sharing a recent common ancestor’, 
and inappropriate theories like astrology under which we might derive a property 
such as ‘born under the sign of Scorpio’? An obvious solution is to limit ourselves to 
theories that have some predictive value; that is, those that give rise to projectable 
                              
32 A recent Internet search generated several hundred hits, with the term now featuring in several 
journal and conference titles. 
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properties. After all, such projectable properties are what allow us to derive com-
pressed descriptions of complex biological systems. So ‘sharing a recent common 
ancestor’ counts because it allows us to predict some of the features of one object by 
studying those of others that share the same property. If one bird builds its nest from 
mud, we should not be surprised if other birds of that species do the same. Spatial 
relationships with distant celestial objects, in contrast, do not give rise to such 
projectable properties. Scorpion horseshoe crabs share no more properties with me 
than do those born under the sign of Sagittarius. 
Although we have now limited ourselves to theories with predictive value, we have 
yet to fully specify which theories to include and which to exclude from our diversity 
measure. Unless we can find some way of privileging one set of theories over all 
others, we will fail to demonstrate that our measure of diversity is strongly intrinsic. 
That is, we would have only diversity with respect to some arbitrarily chosen set of 
theories. 
I suggest that there are several privileged sets of theories that can be used to generate 
a description of a system. One is the empty set. This is the set that would be used to 
generate a theory-free description of the system. This description would contain all 
statements of the form ‘is 4.2±1.7 light years from Proxima Centauri’ or ‘has never 
been found in a ferret’s stomach on a Tuesday’. The empty set is privileged, because 
it is unlike any other set in a very special way. It is the only set containing no 
members. There is nothing arbitrary about the theories contained in the empty set, 
because it contains no theories. However, as we have already seen, it is impossible to 
measure diversity with respect to this set; that is, to measure theory-free diversity. 
Clearly, the list of properties possessed by any system with respect to the empty set 
of theories would be infinitely long, and a measure based on the length of such a 
description is therefore ill-defined. 
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Another privileged set of theories is that represented by a complete and maximally 
concise description of the system. In other words, the set consists of all possible 
descriptive theories pertaining to the system in question. This description is akin to 
the complete description of our VW Beetle encountered previously, where all 
possible theoretical knowledge of VW Beetles has been used to compress the 
information content of the description, but all incompressible portions of the 
complete description remain. As we have seen, measuring the length of such a 
description is akin to measuring Kolmogorov complexity, which is akin to measuring 
entropy. 
Using this same maximal set of theories pertaining to VW Beetles, we could also 
generate another description in which incompressible information has been removed. 
This would then be a complete and maximally concise description of all the regularities 
of the VW Beetle. The regularities of the system can be distinguished from the 
irregularities by the ability to describe them more concisely than with a complete 
(uncompressed) description, so no arbitrary choice need be made about what counts 
as a regularity. As we have also seen, the length of this description can be used as a 
measure of effective complexity. 
Any set of theories that falls between the two extremes described above—the empty 
set and the maximal set—must necessarily be arbitrary. We must either include no 
theoretical knowledge of the system, or all possible theoretical knowledge of the 
system. Anything in between must involve an arbitrary selection. Even the set 
containing all current theoretical knowledge involves an arbitrary choice, namely the 
moment of time defining current. Since we can discount the empty set as not generat-
ing a useful measure, it follows that any intrinsic diversity-like measure must be based 
on a description using all possible theoretical knowledge of the system. 
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As we have just seen, there are at least two intrinsic measures that can be generated 
using the maximal set of theoretical knowledge pertaining to a system. One is an 
entropy measure and the other a measure of effective complexity. Are there others? I 
suggest not. To demonstrate why, take a particular system such as out VW Beetle. 
Now consider the set containing all the descriptions based on the maximal set of 
theoretical knowledge about our VW Beetle. Such descriptions need not be com-
plete; they need only be based on the maximal set of theoretical knowledge about our 
VW Beetle. Suppose we now choose one such description from this set at random. 
What can we conclude about this description? 
First, we know that the description must be maximally compressed—if it were not 
maximally compressed, then there would be some piece of theoretical knowledge 
about our VW Beetle that could potentially be used to compress the description 
further, meaning that the given description would not be based on the maximal set of 
theoretical knowledge about our VW Beetle. Secondly, since the description uses the 
maximal set of theoretical knowledge about our VW Beetle, it must at least contain a 
complete description of the compressible aspects of that VW Beetle. If it did not, the 
set of theories on which it is based would once again not be maximal. 
Finally, we cannot say anything about the overall completeness of the description. 
The overall description would contain a complete description of the regularities of 
the system, but need not contain a compete description of the non-regularities. In 
other words, any description based on the maximal set of theoretical knowledge 
about a given system must contain a complete and maximally compressed description 
of the regularities of that system and some possibly partial description of the non-
regularities. 
If the description of the non-regularities is maximal in size (that is, it describes all the 
non-regularities), then our total description is complete and the measure based on the 
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length of that description is an entropy measure. If the description of the non-
regularities is minimal in size (that is, of zero length), then the total description only 
applies to the regularities of the system and the measure based on the length of that 
description is a measure of effective complexity. For anything in between, an 
arbitrary choice must be made as to which parts of the incompressible description to 
include. That leaves the two extremes as the only two non-arbitrary measures based 
on the maximal set of theoretical knowledge: the entropy measure and the effective 
complexity measure. Any more weakly-defined notion of diversity must involve an 
arbitrary choice about which theories to use. Hence, only by defining diversity in 
terms of entropy or effective complexity can it be considered an intrinsic feature of 
the world. And entropy is simply not the sort of diversity measure we want to use for 
assessing biodiversity. If that were the case, maximising bioentropy could be 
achieved by turning organisms into gases. That leaves one reasonable and intrinsic 
biodiversity measure: biocomplexity. 
This discussion explains why biodiversity is such a problematic concept, and why I 
think the term biodiversity is a misnomer. From the outset we have been trying to 
develop a concept of biodiversity that is intrinsic—a non-arbitrary, non-
anthropocentric and objectively measurable feature of the world. And yet no notion 
of diversity weaker than effective complexity itself could possibly be intrinsic as well 
as measure some diversity-like property. Only by looking at biodiversity in terms of 
complexity can we make it an intrinsic property while retain some sensible meaning. 
5.3 Defending biocomplexity 
Before I try to describe biocomplexity beyond the claim that it can be measured 
using the length of a complete and maximally concise representation of the regulari-
ties of a given biological system, I need to address some immediate potential 
objections to biocomplexity. 
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One apparent problem with effective complexity (and hence biocomplexity) is that 
the choice of language used in any description is arbitrary, which seems to counter 
the claim that effective complexity is strongly intrinsic. We have already encountered 
this problem when discussing Kolmogorov complexity. Recall that the Kolmogorov 
complexity of a string of symbols is defined as the length of the shortest computer 
program that will output that string and then stop. The definition says nothing about 
the programming language that should be used. As we saw, this problem can be 
overcome through some mathematical tricks to minimise the size of the program-
ming language used for each class of systems being measured. Although this 
procedure might be near impossible to apply in practice, in principle at least, 
Kolmogorov complexity is not language-dependent. Since the effective complexity of 
any system can be equated to its Kolmogorov complexity less the information 
content of its ‘noise’, effective complexity, when measured at its most fundamental 
level, is also not language-dependent. In practice, of course, we might use natural 
languages and other less perfect forms of representation when trying to construct an 
approximate and relative measure of effective complexity, but this is a problem only 
with our measurement techniques, not with the underlying property itself. 
A second possible objection with my definition of biocomplexity concerns what I 
mean by ‘regularities’. It might seem that what counts as a regularity to one person 
might not be a regularity to another. I have, however, already countered this 
objection by giving a well-defined procedure for deciding what counts as a regularity. 
Regularities are those elements whose complete descriptions are compressible. A gas, 
for example, has no regularities beyond its bounding envelope, density and so on. A 
complete description of the gas would require that the position of every molecule 
within the bounding envelope be specified. No more concise description exists, and 
hence such a description is incompressible. A perfect crystal of silicon, on the other 
hand, can be concisely described by simply specifying the position, shape and 
orientation of the crystal, and specifying the structure of its lattice. The position of 
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every atom in the crystal can then be predicted with precision, because each atom 
exhibits a well-defined and fixed spatial relationship with its neighbours. 
Another possible objection concerns the temporal aspects of biocomplexity. To date 
my discussions of effective complexity have been very much focussed on the 
structure of static physical systems, whereas for biological systems we are much more 
interested in functions and processes; things with a clear temporal dimension. 
Functions and processes are an important component of biocomplexity. There is no 
reason why biocomplexity cannot be applied to dynamic systems; I have simply 
limited my discussions to static systems to make the examples easier to understand. 
Finally, there is the objection that a complete and maximally concise description of 
any physical system is simply not available. This is particularly the case for biological 
systems, which are so complex as to defy complete description. Although true, this is 
a practical rather than conceptual limitation. Effective complexity is almost impossi-
ble to measure precisely in practice, but that does not prevent us from using it to 
define a non-operational measure of biodiversity. Moreover, we can still devise 
reasonable indicators of biocomplexity based on course-grained descriptions. The 
indicator that best approximates the biocomplexity of a given system will be the one 
that uses the most knowledge at our disposal to characterise all law-like regularities. 
5.4 Biocomplexity—a summary 
Biocomplexity—the measure of biodiversity based on effective complexity—
captures the main attributes that we want from a concept of biodiversity. First, it 
incorporates the notions of heterogeneity, organisation and interaction that underlie 
many biologists’ discussions of biodiversity. Complex objects such as organisms and 
ecosystems have many different parts, intricately organised and interacting among 
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themselves. The greater the internal heterogeneity and organisation of such objects, 
the greater is their measure of effective complexity. 
Secondly, biocomplexity is a multilevel measure. It is not limited to diversity at a 
single level such as species, characters or genes. It incorporates all these levels and 
more, accounting for diversity both between and within species and ecosystems. It 
incorporates what we might previously have considered different types of biodiver-
sity, such as phylogenetic diversity and ecological diversity. We can therefore use 
biocomplexity to quantify more specific conservation targets such as species 
diversity, intra-species diversity or ecosystem integrity. A change in any of these 
conservation targets has a quantifiable effect in terms of biocomplexity. 
Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, biocomplexity is a well-defined, measurable 
and intrinsic feature of the world. In contrast, a measure of biodiversity such as 
higher taxon richness is based on some arbitrary choice of higher taxon levels, 
making it inherently anthropocentric. Unless we can formulate biodiversity in some 
strongly intrinsic sense, reaching agreement on a target property for conservation 
may prove problematic. Just as the lack of a stable target property led to the failure of 
phenetic taxonomy, agreement can never be reached on what constitutes the 
underlying target property of any non-intrinsic biodiversity measure. There simply is 
no single privileged target property underlying such a measure on which we can all 
agree. 
Biocomplexity solves this problem outright. It is an intrinsic property of any 
biological system. Moreover, it is the only intrinsic property that at least approxi-
mately corresponds with what we want from a biodiversity concept. In other words, 
not only is biocomplexity an intrinsic property of biological systems, it is the only 
intrinsic property of such systems on which we can possibly base a concept of 
biodiversity. This gives us some hope that we can at least all agree on what biodiver-
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sity is. Just as there is one true tree of life, ensuring stability in attempts to derive a 
complete cladistic taxonomy, there is also one true measure of biodiversity, namely 
biocomplexity, that can form the foundation on which we can agree about how to 
make rational conservation decisions. 
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6 Applied biocomplexity  
Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution. 
 — Theodosius Dobzhansky 
If the concept of biocomplexity is to have any impact on the process of making real 
conservation decisions, then we must be able to apply it in real situations. In this 
chapter, I hope to develop the concept of biocomplexity further and show what a 
practical approach to measuring biocomplexity might look like. I then return to the 
various measures of biodiversity discussed in Chapter 3, and discuss their relevance 
as indicators of biocomplexity. 
6.1 Estimating biocomplexity 
The effective complexity of any system, you will recall, is the information content of 
a complete and maximally concise description of that system. A true measure of the 
effective complexity of any biological system—in other words of biocomplexity—
would therefore require complete knowledge about that system. Despite its concep-
tual advantages, developing a true measure of biocomplexity is almost certainly 
impossible in practice. Even a single organism such as a cockroach is too complex to 
describe in complete detail. Hence we will never, it seems, be able to measure with 
complete precision the biocomplexity of even a single cockroach, let alone an entire 
ecosystem. 
Clearly, any practical approach to assessing biocomplexity will be based not on a true 
and complete measure of biocomplexity but on some representational estimator. The 
most straightforward way of estimating biocomplexity is to forgo a complete 
description of the given biological system, and instead use a partial ‘coarse-grained’ 
description. The estimated biocomplexity of the system would then be based on the 
length of this coarse-grained description. Although this would not produce an 
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absolute estimate of biocomplexity, it could still provide a useful estimate of relative 
biocomplexity. Fortunately, for nearly all practical problems involving biocomplexity, 
such as assessing conservation value or determining whether biocomplexity corre-
lates with ecosystem stability, a relative measure is sufficient. Although a crude 
estimator of biocomplexity may not be able to tell us, for example, how much 
biocomplexity is possessed by a particular area of land, it may be able to tell us 
whether that area of land has more or less biocomplexity than some other area. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, the more detailed we make our description of something, 
the more accurate it tends to become as a measure of effective complexity. The most 
accurate estimators of biocomplexity will therefore tend to be those that include the 
most detail. Conversely, less detailed descriptions will tend to give rise to less 
accurate estimators of biocomplexity, although such limited accuracy may be 
sufficient for many applications. 
What sort of description is appropriate for estimating biocomplexity? In Chapter 4, 
we compared the complexity of a VW Beetle and a Boeing 747 by comparing the 
lengths of their descriptions written at the level of a technical service manual. In 
comparing the complexities of biological systems, we could adopt a similar approach. 
Consider a single organism such as a cockroach. Although our existing biological 
knowledge is limited, it could still be used to give a highly detailed description of a 
cockroach by focussing on its various levels of internal organisation. For example, we 
know that multicellular animals such as cockroaches can be described in terms of 
their constituent parts or organs, each of which has one or more specialised func-
tions. The organs of cockroaches, for example, include a mouth, two eyes, six legs 
and two antennae. Most of these organs, in turn, also consist of numerous subcom-
ponents. Each leg, for example, comprises both a chitinous shell and numerous hairs. 
We can generally classify each of these subcomponents in terms of its tissue type. 
Each tissue type is in turn composed of multitudes of microscopic cells, which can 
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themselves be divided into numerous subcomponents or organelles—chromosomes, 
ribosomes, mitochondria, vacuoles, lysosomes and a host of other structures. Even 
the organelles are not the most fundamental unit of organisation, as each can be 
described in terms of its constituent enzymes, which in turn consist of various amino 
acids. 
It seems as though the more we learn about the internal organisation of cockroaches, 
the longer our description of them becomes. However, there is a sense in which our 
knowledge of cockroaches reduces their potential description length. That is, if we 
were to describe our cockroach by specifying the exact position and type of every 
atom in the cockroach’s body, as well as how these positions change over time as the 
cockroach moves, eats, digests, reproduces and carries out its other everyday 
functions, we would be confronted with an extremely long description. Such a 
description might be complete, but it is not very concise, and hence unsuitable for 
assessing biocomplexity. Using knowledge of the cockroach’s internal organisation 
reduces the length of this description. We can give a pretty good description of 
where a large part of the cockroach’s atoms reside by describing how many legs the 
cockroach has, what their morphologies are, what cell types these legs are made of, 
what those cell types look like and so on. Only with this detailed knowledge of 
cockroach physiology can we have some hope of concisely describing the internal 
organisation of a cockroach in detail, rather than relying on the hopelessly impractical 
approach of describing the exact position of every cockroach atom. 
Whereas the sort of detailed description of a machine such as a VW Beetle or a 
Boeing 747 results in something that resembles a service manual, a detailed descrip-
tions of an organism such as a cockroach results in something that resembles a 
monograph. Of course, a typical monograph takes for granted much basic biology, 
and thereby omits much of the sort of detail discussed above. Nevertheless, we can 
think of the sort of detailed description of an organism being considered here as a 
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sort of idealised monograph. Such a description, although not complete, is still 
detailed enough for making reasonably accurate relative estimates of biocomplexity. 
We could, for example, compare the length of the idealised monograph of one 
organism such as a cockroach with that of another organism such as a coral to 
estimate the relative biocomplexity of one with respect to the other.33 
Writing idealised monographs of individual organisms such as cockroaches and 
corals is still a long way from contributing to the practical process of making 
conservation decisions. Conservation decisions generally apply at larger scales of 
biological organisation such as whole ecosystems. To assess the biocomplexity of an 
ecosystem using the above methodology would require us to write an idealised 
monograph of each species in the ecosystem, combine them, and then take away all 
the redundant sections, such as might occur with closely related species. Such an 
exercise is still far too impractical. 
The way around this problem is to omit more detail; to carry out the coarse-graining 
process at a higher level. For most practical applications of biodiversity in conserva-
tion, we are typically only interested in determining whether ecosystem A has more 
or less biodiversity than ecosystem B. In such cases, we can generally ignore many of 
the lower levels of biological organisation discussed above. Since DNA is a compo-
nent of all earthly organisms, it is not necessary to describe the structure of DNA 
when comparing the biocomplexities of each system. The complete descriptions of 
each system will both contain a common description of the structure of DNA. 
Similarly, nearly all areas of conservation value will contain a mixture of plants, 
animals, bacteria and fungi, so there is no need to describe the cell structures of each 
                              
33 Such an exercise would presumably demonstrate that cockroaches are substantially more complex 
than corals. 
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of these types of organism if they are common to each system being evaluated. By 
omitting these lower level details, we can focus instead on the larger scale patterns. 
If we only wish to decide which of ecosystem A or B has more biocomplexity, then 
even descriptions with a modest level of detail may no longer be necessary. In many 
cases, the answer is obvious. A tropical rainforest really is more complex (more 
biodiverse) than a desert. There are not only more species in a tropical rainforest 
than a desert but more morphological disparity between species and more ecological 
relationships. Without even attempting to describe either in detail, we can be 
reasonably certain from the outset that a detailed description of one will be much 
longer than that of the other. 
In cases where the outcome is less obvious, existing estimators of biodiversity may 
often be adequate. All other things being equal, a forest containing nine endangered 
mammal species is probably more biocomplex than another forest containing seven. 
Of course, a more detailed assessment may show this not to be the case. The set of 
seven mammal species may include several unique members, while the set of nine 
mammal species may all be from the same genus. However, such cases can still be 
adequately addressed by using a more sophisticated measure than simple species 
richness, such as higher taxon richness. 
As suggested by the above discussion, many existing measures of biodiversity such as 
species richness are reasonable, albeit imperfect, indicators of biocomplexity. This is 
a topic to which we shall return in the following section. Before doing so, however, 
let us consider in more detail the type of information we might expect to use in 
devising practical indicators of biocomplexity. 
Many of the various measures of biodiversity discussed in Chapter 3 were classified 
as phylogenetic measures. Such measures generally involved taking a set of species 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 110 
and then measuring the relative amount of biodiversity of each subset by applying 
some set of criteria based on phylogeny. Hence phylogenetic knowledge is a good 
candidate for inclusion in an indicator measure of biocomplexity. Phylogenetic 
knowledge is useful because it explains a large amount of the pattern we see in 
nature. Since closely related species generally share a host of features, phylogenetic 
knowledge is predictive, in the sense that we can guess a lot of facts about a particu-
lar species from knowledge about its close relatives. In other words, phylogenetic 
knowledge allows us to concisely express a large amount of information. Once we 
have described the phylogeny of a group of species, we have generally gone a long 
way to describing the patterns of similarity between them. 
As we saw in Chapter 3, the patterns of similarity between species arise from two 
different sources: phylogeny and adaptation. Although phylogeny accounts for much 
of the larger-scale patterns of biological similarity, it does not account for all of it. 
Some is attributable to adaptation. So while the similar egg-laying habits of birds and 
lizards owe their origins to a common ancestor, the similarities in wing shape 
between birds and pterosaurs are due to convergent adaptation. 
Given that phylogenetic knowledge can be used to devise indicator measures of 
biocomplexity, we might expect that ecological factors could be used to devise 
alternative indicator measures. Doing so would require a scheme for classifying and 
describing organisms on the basis of their ecological categories. One way of doing 
this is to use Hutchison’s notion of a niche space (Sterelny & Griffiths, 1999, Ch. 11). 
A niche space is a multidimensional space in which each axis corresponds to some 
environmental variable such as temperature or food size. Organisms ‘inhabit’ this 
space, in the sense that they can only survive within a certain range of values for each 
variable. For example, Figure 9 illustrates a two-dimensional portion of niche space 
inhabited by three species, with dimensions representing temperature and food size. 
In this example, species 1 inhabits a distinct portion of niche space with respect to 
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the other two species, whereas the regions inhabited by species 2 and 3 significantly 
overlap. 
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Figure 9: A two-dimensional view of a small portion of niche space inhabited 
by three species. 
We can think of an ecological description of a species as a description of the region 
of niche space it inhabits. An indicator measure of biocomplexity based on niche 
space would simply equate the relative biocomplexity of a set of species with the total 
amount of niche space inhabited by those species. So a set of similar species all with 
similar niches would not occupy too much of niche space and would have a relatively 
low measure of biocomplexity, whereas a set of disparate species, each occupying a 
largely disjoint region of niche space, would have a relatively high measure of 
biocomplexity. 
An ideal measure of biocomplexity would account for all biological structure, 
regardless of its origin. Hence we might expect a sophisticated indicator measure of 
biocomplexity to integrate both phylogenetic and ecological knowledge. However, 
the balance between the two need not be equal. Indeed, there are good reasons for 
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such a measure placing more emphasis on phylogenetic rather than ecological 
patterns. As discussed previously, both phylogenetic and ecological categories are 
projectable, but they are not equally so. Knowing that two species share a phyloge-
netic category such as Aves allows us to project much of the knowledge of one 
species onto the other. Ecological categories such as pelagic macroorganism, however, 
are not as strongly projectable, since ecological functions are multiply realisable. 
Aquatic propulsion is achieved by horizontal tail movement in sharks, vertical tail 
movement in cetaceans and jet propulsion in cephalopods. Even where convergent 
adaptations do exist, the similarities between them are largely superficial. Vertebrate 
and arthropod eyes share a function, that of vision, but morphological they are very 
different. They both embody principles of optics, but otherwise there is little to be 
said about one that can be said about the other. The evolution of shared derived 
traits generates a degree of additional biocomplexity that the evolution of shared 
inherited traits does not. 
There are also good reasons to suggest that the balance between phylogenetic and 
ecological knowledge in indicator measures of biocomplexity might vary depending 
on the evolutionary distance between the taxa being assessed. When assessing closely 
related taxa such as the Anseriformes,34 we might expect homoplasy to be common. 
In the case of disparate taxa, homoplasy is much rarer. Two species of duck share a 
relatively recent common ancestor, but they may also share a range of ecological 
variables such as feeding mode. The two species may therefore share similar 
evolutionary pressures, as well as inherited evolutionary constraints. Hence many of 
the adaptations to a diving mode of feeding in one species will be shared by another 
species with the same feeding mode (Faith, 1989). Koalas and caterpillars also share a 
                              
34 Ducks, geese and swans. 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 113 
feeding mode, that of leaf eating, but the radically different evolutionary histories of 
these two taxa have led to radically different solutions to a leaf-eating lifestyle. Hence 
we should see an increased predominance of phylogenetic over ecological patterns as 
we move from measuring biocomplexity over smaller to larger scales. If the scale of 
analysis is sufficiently large, a totally phylogenetic focus may be valid. 
6.2 Measures of biodiversity—a retrospective 
In Chapter 3, I discussed some of the principal biodiversity measures that have been 
developed for assisting the process of making conservation decisions. We are now in 
a position to revisit these measures and assess their usefulness as indicators of 
biocomplexity. 
6.2.1 Biocomplexity, species richness and higher taxa 
The first biodiversity measure encountered in Chapter 3 was species richness—simply 
the number of species in a given sample. The main advantages of species richness are 
its conceptual and practical simplicity. Species are, for the most part, easily delineated 
and countable entities. However, as we saw in Chapter 3, species richness is unable 
to account for the degree of difference between species. Some clades such as beetles 
are millions of times richer in species than others such as tuataras and coelacanths, 
yet seem to possess far less than a million times as much biodiversity. Similarly, a 
group of organisms comprising two distinct species would appear to have more 
biodiversity than a group comprising two similar species. 
As an indicator of biocomplexity, species richness adopts a fairly coarse-grained level 
of representing biological systems. The system is described simply in terms of a list 
of species, with each species counting as a single unit. As we have already seen, such 
coarse-grained analysis may be perfectly adequate for many applications. In most 
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cases, a larger set of species will tend to be more biocomplex than a smaller set, 
which is often all we need to know. 
Although species richness does tend to correlate positively with biocomplexity, it 
does so rather imperfectly given its inability to account for the degree of difference 
between species. Species are not additive units in terms of their biocomplexity. There 
is much redundancy between the descriptions of two closely related species, and 
hence their joint biocomplexity is substantially less than the simple addition of their 
individual biocomplexities. Conversely, species richness will tend to be more accurate 
as an indicator of biocomplexity when the species in question are relatively disparate. 
In Chapter 3, we also encountered the biodiversity measure of higher taxon richness. As 
we saw, this measure offers both practical and theoretical advantages over species 
richness. Higher taxa are more easily distinguished and less numerous than individual 
species, making them a more practical unit of study in field surveys. Higher taxa also 
tend to categorise similar species together, thus avoiding the problem of highly 
speciose clades having inordinately high measures of biodiversity. The main theoreti-
cal problem with higher taxon richness is the artificiality of higher taxa themselves. 
There simply is no well-principled means of determining where we should draw the 
boundary that delineates one higher taxon from another. 
Despite these limitations, higher taxon richness is potentially a very good indicator of 
biocomplexity. Provided we delineate the higher taxa appropriately, we can think of 
each higher taxon as comprising a similar amount of biocomplexity. Some taxa will 
contain many similar species, while others will consist of one or two distinct species. 
The combined description of all the species in a speciose taxon will contain lots of 
redundancy, whereas the description of the single species in a unitary taxon will not. 
Provided we have properly determined the right levels for delineating each taxon, the 
concise descriptions of each taxon should be about the same length. Furthermore, 
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given that the degree of overlap between the descriptions of higher taxa is less than 
in the case of individual species, combining the biocomplexities of higher taxa will 
tend to approximate an additive measure more accurately, albeit still somewhat 
imperfectly. 
Another nice feature of higher taxon richness is that it meaningfully combines both 
phylogenetic and ecological patterns. Species richness, in contrast, measures only 
phylogenetic patterns. Its limitations as an indicator of biocomplexity stem in large 
part from its inability to account for the degree of evolutionary change within each 
lineage. Australia’s crows and ravens are all remarkably similar in appearance and 
habit, while Darwin’s Galapagos finches are not. Species richness simply treats each 
species as a single unit of biocomplexity, regardless of diversity. In contrast, the 
degree of evolutionary change in response to ecological pressures is a central 
criterion for determining the levels at which higher taxa are defined. The species 
within a taxon may be unified by their phylogeny, but they are separated from other 
taxa in part by their ecological-determined disparity. 
6.2.2 Genetic biocomplexity 
In Chapter 3, I discussed genetic measures of biodiversity and rejected the idea that 
we should think of genetic diversity as any more fundamental than, say, phenotypic 
diversity. I argued that there is no meaningful sense in which we can reduce pheno-
typic diversity to genotypic diversity. How then does genetic diversity fair as an 
indicator of biocomplexity? 
Thinking of genes in terms of complexity is not a new idea. “Genetic information” is 
a common phrase even outside scientific circles. A straightforward approach to 
measuring genetic information would be to count the number of bits of information 
encoded by a sequence of DNA. The human genome, for example, contains 
approximately 3 billion base pairs, each of which encodes two bits of information (22 
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= 4 possible base pairs). This gives a total information content of 6 gigabits, roughly 
the information storage capacity of a single CD-ROM. Other species have even more 
genetic information. The newt Triturus cristatus, for example, has a genome with 40 
gigabits of information (Dawkins, 1999). It seems, however, that newts are not an 
order of magnitude more complex than humans, so it is commonly presumed that 
the genomes of species such as Triturus cristatus contain a lot of redundancy. To 
measure what Richard Dawkins calls the “true information content” of the genome 
(Dawkins, 1999), we first have to strip out this redundancy.  
As we have seen, complexity is not simply measured by information content. To 
measure the complexity of a genetic sequence, we need to measure the information 
content of the compressible portions of the sequence, once that information has 
been maximally compressed. Such a procedure should be applicable to genetic 
sequences, at least in theory. Some genomes really are more complex than others in 
terms of the extent to which they encode lots of compressible information. Perhaps 
there is even a good correlation between the complexity of genotypes and the 
complexity of phenotypes; an empirical question of some interest. 
Practically, however, there are major obstacles to measuring genetic complexity. First, 
we cannot easily distinguish signal from noise. In other words, we do not know 
which parts of a genome are compressible, because there is insufficient agreement as 
to what constitutes so-called “junk DNA” (Kimura, 1983). Secondly, we have little 
idea of what compression algorithm to apply to the remaining genetic information to 
determine its maximally compressed length. In the computer sciences, various 
compression algorithms have been developed for dealing with all sorts of data files. 
Some of these algorithms are well suited to compressing files containing images, 
while others are good at compressing files containing music. The better we under-
stand the system, the more optimally we can compress its information content. So if 
we know that a file contains an image, we can write a really good algorithm to 
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achieve a good compression ratio based on what we know about the way information 
in image files tends to be organised. If the file contains a music track, on the other 
hand, we would be able to achieve greater compression by writing a different 
algorithm using what we know about the way information is organised in music files. 
The problem with trying to quantify genetic complexity is that we simply do not 
know enough about the way genetic information is organised to write a reasonable 
compression algorithm. In time, though, we may develop such understanding. Doing 
so requires two-way feedback between molecular and developmental biology. To 
infer a phenotype from a genotype, we first have to understand how the phenotype is 
built and then read that understanding back into the genotype. Our understanding of 
molecular biology grows by exploring the genetic and phenotypic levels simultane-
ously and letting them incrementally illuminate one another. With such an under-
standing, we might eventually be able to measure genetic complexity, which in turn 
may prove to be a very useful indicator of biocomplexity. At present, however, 
genetic complexity seems like a very poor practical indicator of biocomplexity. 
6.2.3 Biocomplexity and phylogenetic biodiversity 
In Chapter 3, I discussed various phylogenetic biodiversity measures. The main 
feature of these measures is that they use taxonomic distinctness as a means of 
quantifying the degree of difference between taxa. So if species A and B are more 
closely related to one another than either is to C, a phylogenetic measure of biodiver-
sity would typically consider the set containing only A and B to be less biodiverse 
than the sets containing either A and C or B and C. 
The most sophisticated of the phylogenetic diversity measures examined was character 
richness. We can use this measure to estimate which subsets of a group of taxa have 
the greatest amount of phylogenetic diversity by constructing the cladogram for the 
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group of taxa, weighting each branch according to the inferred character state 
changes, and selecting those subsets which maximise total intervening branch length. 
Character richness is likely to be a more accurate estimator of biocomplexity than 
simple measures such as species richness because it uses a smaller unit of currency, 
namely character. Rather than use a representation in which each species counts as a 
single unit, character richness represents each species in terms of its constituent 
characters. In theory, such an approach could not only give an indication of the 
complexity of each species in terms of the number of characters it possesses, it could 
also, as an indicator of biocomplexity among groups of species, resolve the additivity 
problem by ensuring characters are only counted once, thereby removing much of 
the redundancy between the representations of each species. 
Several criticisms of character richness were raised in Chapter 3. In particular, not all 
characters seem to warrant equal weighting. A complex trait such as a vertebrate eye, 
for example, can be broken down into a suite of constituent traits. There are no clear 
rules about whether we should consider this a single trait or a collection of several 
traits. A conceptual solution to this problem is to weight each trait according to its 
complexity. Whereas an eye, for example, would be given a high weight, simple traits 
such as skin pigmentation would be given a correspondingly low weight. Again, for 
many applications, such detail may be unnecessary; an equally weighted character 
richness measure may be more than adequate. Nevertheless, the potential to weight 
traits according to their complexity counters the conceptual objection that traits are 
incommensurate. 
There are several other ways in which existing measures of character richness can be 
improved to make them more suitable as indicators of biocomplexity. For example, 
most existing measures do not count root characters. The reasoning is that character 
richness should measure diversity between set members. Hence any character state 
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changes before the first speciation event separating members of a solution subset do 
not count. From a biocomplexity perspective, this assumption is not valid. If we 
consider character state changes simply as an indicator of biocomplexity, then any 
character state changes are relevant, no matter when they occur. This problem is 
easily resolved by simply including root characters in the procedure of selecting 
solution subsets. 
A further way of making existing character richness measures more suitable as 
indicators of biocomplexity is to change the way they treat homoplastic characters; 
that is, similar characters that have evolved independently. Biocomplexity is meas-
ured by describing all regularity. There is no discrimination as to the origins of 
regularity. So when we described our VW Beetle to generate a measure of its 
complexity, it did not matter whether the left front wheel was similar to the right 
front wheel because they were made by the same manufacturer or because different 
manufacturers came up with the same solution to a common problem. All that 
mattered was that they were the same. Most of the description of one can be used as 
a description of the other, allowing us to compress our overall description and 
minimise its length without sacrificing completeness.  
An analogous argument can be applied to species. From the perspective of biocom-
plexity, it does not matter whether a particular trait shared by species A and B 
evolved independently or not. All that matters is that they share the same trait. 
Existing character richness measures ignore homoplasy by counting shared derived 
traits along each lineage. The solution is simply to refrain from double-counting 
homoplastic characters. In other words, we should measure character richness in a 
literal sense, rather than measuring phylogenetic diversity weighted by character state 
changes. 
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Depending on how we interpret the relationship between our indicator measure of 
character richness and our target property of biocomplexity, the solution suggested 
above may not be completely appropriate. So far I have been interpreting character 
richness as a way of representing a species or group of species. Under this interpreta-
tion, character richness is a direct indicator of biocomplexity. An alterative way of 
interpreting character richness is as an indicator of some intermediate property such 
as evolutionary distance. So the more character state changes there are between 
species A and B, the more independent evolution has occurred between them. 
According to this interpretation, evolutionary distance is a direct indicator of 
biocomplexity, whereas character richness is an indirect indicator. Under such an 
interpretation, double-counting of homoplastic characters is probably valid, since it is 
likely to result in a better correlation with the intermediate property of evolutionary 
distance. This second interpretation is reasonable, given that character richness 
measures are usually applied to representative samples of character state change data, 
rather than to some vast set of data intended to describe a set of species completely. 
In other words, character richness often looks like the ‘sample model’ phylogenetic 
diversity measures illustrated by Figure 3 in Chapter 3. 
Despite the enormous practical difficulties in measuring biocomplexity with 
precision, estimating biocomplexity using various indicator measures is practically 
feasible. Moreover, several existing measures of biodiversity adequately provide such 
indicator measures. By providing a definitive answer to the question ‘What is 
biodiversity?’, the concept of biocomplexity can allow the practical development and 
application of such measures to continue without metaphysical encumbrance. 
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7 Conclusion  
God is in the details. 
 — Ludwig Mies van der Rohe 
7.1 A rational argument for biocomplexity  
How should we understand biodiversity? My answer is simple—complexity. This is, I 
believe, the answer that makes most sense of the concept. It is the only way of 
understanding biodiversity that both makes it an intrinsic property of biological 
systems and incorporates the main attributes we want from such a concept. If we 
want a well-defined, measurable and metaphysically strong concept of biodiversity 
that captures more than just species richness—that incorporates all forms of 
heterogeneity, organisation and interaction at every conceivable level—then biocom-
plexity is the only answer. It is the only reasonable concept of biodiversity that 
delineates some objective property of the world. 
The advantages of this strongly intrinsic concept of biodiversity should not be 
underestimated. First, it matches our intuitions—that biodiversity is an independently 
specifiable property we can measure. Secondly, it ensures stability. Without some 
such firm foundation on which to base our measurement procedures, there is little 
chance of reaching agreement on what it is we are trying to measure. Thirdly, a non-
anthropocentric concept of biodiversity is meaningful. It enables us to discover 
things we do not already know, such as whether ecosystem A really does have more 
biodiversity than ecosystem B. Fourthly, an intrinsic concept of biodiversity carries 
more political weight. If biodiversity were only defined anthropocentrically, those 
arguing against its protection would have two basic strategies available to them. One 
strategy would be to dismiss the importance of biodiversity. This strategy might 
admit the existence of biodiversity, but deny its relevance as a target of conservation 
efforts. The second strategy would be to deny biodiversity’s very existence as an 
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independently-specifiable target property of conservation. By arguing that biodiver-
sity is suspect, proponents of such an argument would not even have to address its 
relevance to conservation. With a metaphysically robust concept of biodiversity, this 
second strategy is cut-off, narrowing the ground on which such battles can permissi-
bly be fought. 
Finally, an intrinsic concept of biodiversity is essential to those wishing to use 
biodiversity in pursuing environmental ethics from a position of moral realism. If 
species have intrinsic value—if they have rights that transcend what we think of 
them—then those rights must be rooted in something more fundamental than our 
particular preferences and prejudices. As I have already stated, I do not wish to 
pursue such an argument. For those who do, however, an intrinsic concept of 
biocomplexity is a good place to start. 
In Chapter 2, I pointed out that there are two distinct types of biodiversity concept. 
One type, on which I have focussed, is targeted at issues of conservation. This sort 
of biodiversity is something of value worth protecting. The other type of biodiversity 
concept is scientific. It is the sort of biodiversity that might play some useful role in 
scientific theories. Biocomplexity, I have argued, is useful for understand the 
conservation-based type of biodiversity concept. How useful, then, is it for under-
standing the scientific concept of biodiversity? Could biocomplexity play some useful 
role in scientific theories, just as the concept of mass plays a useful role in Newtonian 
mechanics?  
As I pointed out in Chapter 2, there are at least three features a concept must have 
for it to be scientifically valuable. It must be well defined, based on some natural 
properties of the world and useful in some scientific theory. Biocomplexity meets the 
first two criteria. Moreover, it is the only well-defined and strongly intrinsic property 
that roughly corresponds to the popular meaning of biodiversity. How well biocom-
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plexity meets the third criterion—how useful it is in scientific theories such as the 
species-area law—is an empirical question, and therefore not mine to answer. 
However, as an intrinsic property, biocomplexity seems the most appropriate 
concept to use in attempting to answer such questions. Are complex ecosystems 
more or less stable than simple ecosystems? This is a question already being asked in 
ecology. Complexity is seen as the sort of property that might have some causal 
relationship with ecosystem stability. Like complex machines with cybernetic control 
systems, ecosystems have lots of feedback loops. A feedback loop with a small 
amount of gain can enhance system stability, while a feedback loop with a large 
amount of gain can create instability. Perhaps the complexity of an ecosystem 
determines how many and what type of feedback loops it has, which in turn 
determine its stability. Does biodiversity reflect the evolutionary time elapsed without 
major disturbance? Does it reflect the frequency of major disturbances? Again, these 
are not unreasonable questions. Answering them may be difficult, but at least with a 
solid concept of biodiversity we can be sure what questions we are trying to answer. 
7.2 An impassioned plea for biocomplexity 
In Chapter 1, I raised a question about the metaphysical status of biodiversity. I have, 
hopefully, provided a satisfying answer to this question. I also raised a quite different 
question—Why should we protect biodiversity? From the outset, I made a clear 
choice to avoid any attempt to answer this question definitively. And yet the question 
lingers. Why protect biodiversity? In the light of biocomplexity, this question has 
taken on a new significance. Why should we protect biocomplexity? What is so 
special about complexity that makes it worth having? 
There is no simple answer to this question. Correlations between complexity and the 
various types of instrumental value possessed by the natural world are in many cases 
poor. The instrumental value of a wheat field is typically greater than the instrumen-
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tal value of the forest that was cleared to produce it, and yet the wheat field is 
undoubtedly less complex. Some types of instrumental value, however, do correlate 
reasonably well with complexity. A forest is certainly more likely to harbour a cure 
for cancer or a natural predator for an introduced crop-eating insect than a wheat 
field. If we care about protecting the world’s living resources for purely instrumental 
reasons, biocomplexity seems like a pretty good indicator of such instrumental value.  
In the end, most arguments for protecting nature on the basis of instrumental value 
are, I believe, weak rationalisations of a deeper passion. In a thought experiment in 
which we strip nature of all its instrumental value, nature is not left valueless. Nature 
has non-instrumental (but non-intrinsic) value. It has inherent value. I have never 
seen Da Vinci’s Last Supper. It was being restored when I visited Milan. Call me a 
philistine, but I have never read The Tempest. And I have never seen a kakapo. Yet all 
of these things matter. Why celebrate Shakespeare? Why preserve the Last Supper? 
Why protect the kakapo from extinction? None of these things are of much 
instrumental value to me, and yet I value them. I do not really understand why. Their 
value seems rooted in a desire that simply springs forth without rational foundation. 
Complexity, I believe, is a pretty good indicator of inherent value. Why do we 
celebrate Shakespeare? Because his work is complex. Look at how difficult it can be 
to fully understand him, at how many books have been written on his work. We find 
Shakespeare fascinating because his work is complex; because there is so much to say 
about it. Barbara Cartland may have written more words than Shakespeare, but she 
essentially wrote the same story several thousand times with different names and 
locations. Unlike Shakespeare, her life’s work is full of redundancy. 
Why do we (ought we) try to protect the kakapo from extinction? Because its 
continued existence adds a significant amount of complexity to the world. Of course, 
a world without kakapos would still have lots of other parrots, but it would have no 
   
Biodiversity: its measurement and metaphysics 125 
nocturnal flightless parrots. There is a lot to be said about kakapos that cannot be 
said about any other creatures. They represent several million years of interesting and 
irreplaceable evolutionary design. Complexity matters. In the end, though, my 
argument for protecting biocomplexity is not easily defended. I can give no rational 
justification for protecting the inherent value of biocomplexity, because it is not 
reducible to more basic human desires. I can only hope that you accept my impas-
sioned plea. 
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